State Bureaucratic Undermining by Weinstein-Tull, Justin
 
1083 
The University of Chicago 
Law Review 
 
Volume 85 September 2018 Number 5 
© 2018 by The University of Chicago 
ARTICLES 
State Bureaucratic Undermining 
Justin Weinstein-Tull† 
Our federal rights are failing, and the inner workings of state government pro-
vide an explanation. States administer more federal rights than ever before; admin-
istering those rights requires intrastate coordination both horizontally (across cabi-
net-level state actors, agencies, and commissions) and vertically (with local 
governments like counties and towns). That coordination undermines federal law by 
creating bureaucratic barriers to full compliance. I unearth and identify three of these 
barriers—agency alienation, agency conflict, and role confusion—by surveying reme-
dies in recent suits against state actors. These remedies take the form of choreography: 
they specify how internal state actors must work together to vindicate federal rights. 
I find that coordinating state bureaucracy requires the political will of several 
state actors, so federal rights that require intrastate coordination will not always 
reach politically marginalized groups like racial minorities and low-income popula-
tions. Because recent federalism scholarship has focused on lawful cooperation and 
conflict between states and the federal government, it has missed the ways that state 
coordination-based noncompliance can reinforce the very racial and income inequal-
ity that federal rights seek to address. State bureaucracy undermines federal rights 
in unexpected locations that do not follow traditional patterns of partisanship or ge-
ography. Remedying state noncompliance of this kind requires state and federal au-
thorities to create coordination pathways through state bureaucracy responsive to the 
state’s coordination challenges. 
 
 † Associate Professor, Arizona State University College of Law. I am grateful to the 
readers who made this paper what it is, the teachers who gave more support than I deserve, 
and the friends who inexplicably saw brightness throughout. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Turbulence rocks the federal government, and it is now faddish 
to romanticize states as sites of resistance. California “strikes a bold 
pose as vanguard of the resistance.”1 New York “emerg[es] as the 
East . . . Coast headquarters of opposition to the incoming admin-
istration.”2 Federalism scholars tell us not to worry about decentral-
izing power from the federal government to states; states are more 
trustworthy now. We no longer live in “your father’s federalism.”3 
Not so fast. States have long undermined federal civil rights,4 
and they continue to do so in new ways. It is now politically expe-
dient for politicians in New York and California to resist the con-
servative federal government with progressive policies and 
speeches. But even as they do, these same states fight federal civil 
 
 1 Adam Nagourney, California Strikes a Bold Pose as Vanguard of the Resistance (NY 
Times, Jan 18, 2017), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/us/california-strikes-a 
-bold-pose-as-vanguard-of-the-resistance.html (visited Apr 18, 2018) (Perma archive una-
vailable). See also Editorial, California Looks to Lead the Trump Resistance (NY Times, Dec 
9, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/opinion/california-looks-to-lead-the 
-trump-resistance.html (visited Apr 18, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable).  
 2 Gabriel Debenedetti, Trump Opposition Sets Up Blue-State Headquarters (Politico, 
Jan 8, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/MUM5-NDHD. 
 3 Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 Cal L Rev 1695, 1696 (2017). See also 
Heather Gerken, We’re about to See States’ Rights Used Defensively against Trump (Vox, 
Jan 20, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/7CVV-L3KM. 
 4 See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 Harv L Rev 1969, 1980 (2008) (“State 
and local power were key sources of resistance to [the civil rights] movement.”); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 Fla L Rev 499, 513 (1995). 
2018] State Bureaucratic Undermining 1085 
rights laws in court and, through inattention and disorganization, 
thwart them on the ground.5 We need a more complete account of 
how federal rights fare—and fail—inside of state bureaucracy. 
In fact, many of our federal rights administered by states are 
failing.6 These are important rights and high stakes, and the work-
ings of state government provide some explanations. This Article 
describes how states undermine federal rights not from hostility, 
but because they are plural bodies that lack coordination. States 
diffuse their powers. They do so horizontally (across cabinet-level 
state actors, agencies, and commissions) and vertically (down to 
local governments like counties, towns, and special interest dis-
tricts).7 State coordination problems are akin to a friction; inten-
tional or not, they slow and stop federal law. Because this friction 
arises from large administrative structures, it appears in places 
you might not expect: large states without a history of intentionally 
resisting federal civil rights laws.8 
 
 5 See Part II. 
 6 For general discussion of seemingly intractable noncompliance, see Lisa L. Miller, 
The Invisible Black Victim: How American Federalism Perpetuates Racial Inequality in 
Criminal Justice, 44 L & Society Rev 805, 805–06 (2010) (reviewing statistics and asking 
“[h]ow are we to make sense of [racial] disparities half a century after Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954), the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965?”). More 
specifically, noncompliance with many of the federal rights this Article focuses on—in par-
ticular the right to counsel and federal voting rights—is widespread. Nationally, states have 
failed to fulfill the promise set out by the Sixth Amendment. See David Carroll, Gideon’s 
Despair: Four Things the Next Attorney General Needs to Know about America’s Indigent 
Defense Crisis (The Marshall Project, Jan 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/W6AH-EL26; 
Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 NYU Rev L & Soc 
Change 427, 429 (2009) (“[D]espite voluminous documentation of the indigent defense crisis, 
the crisis persists.”). And the recent Presidential Commission on Election Administration 
report, as well as other recent surveys, have described widespread noncompliance with fed-
eral election laws. Presidential Commission on Election Administration, The American Vot-
ing Experience: Report and Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Election 
Administration 15–18 (2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4R5D-KNBT. See also Justin 
Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 Mich L Rev 747, 759–61 (2016) (describing 
widespread noncompliance with a set of federal election laws). 
 7 To see how states have decentralized their powers horizontally across state actors, 
see Council of State Governments, 49 The Book of the States 189–94 (2017) (listing the ap-
pointment method of various state-level directors in each state). For discussion of broad 
state delegation to local governments, see Justin Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federal-
ism, 117 Colum L Rev 839, 847–64 (2017) (describing state delegation of administrative 
responsibilities to local governments in the contexts of elections, public assistance, indigent 
defense, prison conditions, and education); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The 
Structure of Local Government Law, 90 Colum L Rev 1, 1 (1990) (“State legislatures, often 
criticized for excessive interference in local matters, have frequently conferred significant 
political, economic and regulatory authority on many localities.”). 
 8 In this paper, I highlight examples from California, New York, Illinois, and other 
states. 
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Few federal rights acknowledge or accommodate state decen-
tralization. They place obligations on “states” and do not specify 
how a state must administer the right. Here is an example. The 
National Voter Registration Act9 (NVRA) requires that “each State 
shall” provide voter registration opportunities in certain state of-
fices: motor vehicle offices, public assistance offices, disability ser-
vices offices, and military recruitment offices.10 
“[E]ach State shall” is a deceptively simple command. Who, or 
what, is the “state”? The state secretary of state may be the state’s 
chief election official and technically responsible for the state’s com-
pliance with the NVRA,11 but secretaries of state lack authority over 
motor vehicle offices, public assistance offices, disability services of-
fices, and military recruitment offices—some of which are adminis-
tered locally. Nor do secretaries of state control the state budget, 
necessary for vindicating a federal requirement that itself provides 
no funding for compliance. Statewide compliance with the NVRA, 
therefore, requires coordination across the state bureaucracy. 
The NVRA is not alone; other federal rights—including pillars 
of our federal civil rights laws—require complex intrastate coordi-
nation to achieve statewide compliance. The Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel,12 for example, requires state legislatures to fund 
and design indigent defense programs, state executive officers to 
oversee those programs, and—because many states use local gov-
ernments to administer their criminal justice systems—local of-
fices to actually provide counsel. Cooperative-federalism programs 
that partner states with the federal government to administer pro-
grams like food stamps, cash assistance, disability assistance, and 
others also require intrastate coordination.13 
 
 9 Pub L No 103-31, 107 Stat 77 (1993). 
 10 52 USC § 20504(a)–(c) (mandating that each state shall provide voter registration 
opportunities with driver’s license applications and renewals in motor vehicle offices); 52 
USC § 20506(a)(2)(A) (public assistance agencies); 52 USC § 20506(a)(2)(B) (state disability 
offices); 52 USC § 20506(a)(3)(B) (other state and local agencies, such as public libraries, 
public schools, city and county clerks’ offices, fishing and hunting license bureaus, govern-
ment revenue offices, and unemployment compensation offices); 52 USC § 20506(c) (military 
recruitment offices). Other federal election laws make similarly vague requirements on 
states. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), Pub L No 
99-410, 100 Stat 924 (1986), for example, requires that “[e]ach state shall” send absentee 
ballots to military and overseas voters who request them no fewer than forty-five days before 
an election. 52 USC § 20302(a)(8). 
 11 National Conference of State Legislatures, Election Administration at State and Lo-
cal Levels (June 15, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/AJ5B-QFYH. 
 12 See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 343–45 (1963) (requiring states to provide 
counsel to indigent criminal defendants who cannot afford their own). 
 13 See Part II.A. 
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State bureaucracy provides a natural resistance to this kind of 
coordination. Coordination requires cooperation and consent, or 
clear chains of legal command to resolve conflict.14 As Professors 
Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky put it in their foundational 
work on policy implementation, the “multiplicity of participants 
and perspectives,” even when everyone supports the policy out-
come, creates an administrative “obstacle course.”15 
In addition, states are now at their most complex and shel-
tered from federal intrusion. States have expanded and profession-
alized their bureaucracies.16 In doing so, they gained the faith of 
the federal government, which entrusted them to administer fed-
eral policies, growing them even further.17 As states took on a more 
prominent role in federal policy administration, the Supreme 
Court protected state sovereignty from federal intrusion in new 
ways.18 
These trends now collide in our federal system: state bureau-
cracy is larger than ever before; states administer more federal 
laws and rights than ever before, and those rights sprawl across 
state bureaucracies in complex ways; and state control over its bu-
reaucracy is more insulated from the federal government than ever 
before. 
This Article takes that collision as its starting point. It de-
scribes the topography of state bureaucratic undermining, or the 
relationships between state actors that federal rights demand: in-
teragency, interbranch, and state-local. It provides a typology that 
categorizes the kinds of bureaucratic roadblocks that arise: alien-
ation between state actors, conflict between state actors, and role 
confusion. 
Although these descriptions may not be flashy, they are both 
long overdue and crucial to understanding the reach of federal 
power and the nature of inequality. Despite Professor Owen Fiss’s 
 
 14 See Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation: How Great Expec-
tations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It’s Amazing That Federal Programs 
Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration As Told by 
Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes 
133–35 (Berkeley 3d ed 1984). 
 15 Id at 102. 
 16 See Part I. 
 17 See Part I. 
 18 See William N. Eskridge Jr, Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 Mich L Rev 2062, 2319 (2002) (noting that 
the Supreme Court sought to protect state sovereignty by conducting a “rollback of federal 
legislative power” in the 1990s as states regained their credibility after the civil rights era). 
See also notes 61–81 and accompanying text (describing doctrinal changes protecting states 
from federal intrusion). 
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declaration in 1979 that state bureaucracy was “a new unit of con-
stitutional law,”19 state bureaucracy remains unforgivably under-
studied.20 What the literature lacks is a systematic, realistic dis-
cussion of states as plural bodies, including the kinds of state 
coordination that federal law demands and how those demands 
both create noncompliance with federal rights and shape admin-
istration of those rights.21 
I also intend this Article to provide a necessary counterpart to 
recent federalism scholarship that has provided novel accounts of 
benefits of federal policy decentralization but has paid little atten-
tion to its contemporary costs. That scholarship has described com-
plex pathways between the federal government and states.22 It has 
 
 19 Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv L Rev 1, 4 (1979). 
 20 See Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial Administration, 131 Harv L Rev 483, 485 (2017) 
(noting a dearth of scholarship on American governors); Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochial-
ism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 Admin L Rev 551, 553 
(2001) (noting the lack of scholarship on state administrative law). Penetrating work on 
internal conflicts between and within federal agencies is just starting to appear. See Daniel 
A. Farber and Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 Cal L Rev 1375, 1387–
1408 (2017) (describing recent research that examines inter- and intra-agency cooperation 
and conflict in the federal bureaucracy and setting out a helpful typology of these conflicts); 
Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 Harv L Rev 421, 451–73 (2015); Bijal Shah, 
Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 Harv L Rev 805, 820–30 (2015); Jason 
Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 Ariz St L J 183, 189–200 (2013); Jody Freeman 
and Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 Harv L Rev 1131, 
1145–51 (2012). Professor Bertrall Ross has also done fascinating recent work on how fed-
eral agencies protect vulnerable groups by administering civil rights statutes. See Bertrall 
L. Ross II, Administering Suspect Classes, 66 Duke L J 1807, 1829–39 (2017); Bertrall L. 
Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 BU L Rev 519, 527–30 (2015). 
 21 With a few exceptions. See Bridget A. Fahey, Health Care Exchanges and the Dis-
aggregation of States in the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 125 Yale L J F 56, 
59–64 (2015) (describing intrastate conflict in the context of the Affordable Care Act); Bridget 
A. Fahey, Consent Procedures and American Federalism, 128 Harv L Rev 1561, 1573–75 
(2015); Roderick M. Hills Jr, Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and 
Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 Mich L Rev 1201, 1232 (1999) (consider-
ing how courts should treat state law that prevents state and local officials from adminis-
tering federal law). 
 22 See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 Harv L Rev 
4, 21–44 (2010). Other scholars have examined the ways that states energize, resist, and 
work around federal laws—in particular, cooperative-federalism programs like health care, 
telecommunications law, and public assistance laws. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Fed-
eralism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Re-
form and Beyond, 121 Yale L J 534, 584–94 (2011) (noting that the Affordable Care Act 
contains at least five different kinds of federal-state cooperation); Jessica Bulman-Pozen 
and Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L J 1256, 1285–87 (2009) (de-
scribing how disagreement among the federal, state, and local governments can result in 
productive dialogue and disagreement); Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional 
Duels: Separation of Powers and State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Pro-
grams and Standards, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 1343, 1370–83 (2005) (suggesting that state 
law and state courts, rather than federal courts employing the Supremacy Clause, are the 
better fora for reconciling state constitutional constraints with federal obligations); Philip 
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discovered that federal-state cooperation and conflict extend far 
beyond the formal markers of statutory and constitutional law into 
administrative realms23 and even more informal interactions. 
This scholarship takes as a premise that, on the whole, state 
and local governments administer federal policies in ways that do 
not systematically reinforce or compound inequality and racial 
stratification. Or, if they do, the federal government can easily de-
tect and correct that bias.24 Perhaps for this reason, this scholar-
ship tends not to closely examine structural racism and inequal-
ity.25 When it examines state conflict with the federal government, 
it looks at ways states shape existing federal law through their own 
lawmaking, rather than examining patterns of actual state noncom-
pliance with federal rights. This lowers the stakes of state-federal 
conflict: it’s easier to celebrate that conflict when the downside is 
state action that is still lawful. 
To the extent contemporary federalism scholarship has consid-
ered in depth the drawbacks of decentralization caused by state 
misbehavior, it has worried about “local racists”26 and state “re-
sistance and rebellion.”27 These are worthy fears!—indeed, local 
racism and state rebellion are both thriving and particularly visi-
ble in today’s climate28—but incomplete ones. The bureaucratic un-
dermining described in this Article does not depend on individual 
 
J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 NC L Rev 
663, 677–81 (2001) (explaining why theories of state empowerment based on contract and 
preemption fail to sufficiently authorize state agencies to comply with the Telecommunica-
tions Act). 
 23 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 Va L Rev 
953, 994–1001 (2016) (describing how state and federal bureaucracies negotiate and interact 
to create beneficial, state-differentiated national policy in some cooperative-federalism 
schemes). 
 24 See Gerken, 124 Harv L Rev at 65 (cited in note 22) (noting that a strong national 
majority can reverse local majorities when it chooses, mitigating costs associated with de-
centralizing power to states or local governments that oppress racial minorities “in defiance 
of a national majority”). I have previously questioned the strength of this national “trump 
card.” See Weinstein-Tull, 117 Colum L Rev at 889 & n 311 (cited in note 7). 
 25 It sometimes relegates questions about systemic stratification to an aside. See, for 
example, Roderick M. Hills Jr, The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State 
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 Mich L Rev 813, 890 (1998) (con-
ceding that his argument against federal commandeering might fail if “state and local gov-
ernments systematically underrepresent racial minorities or other disadvantaged or disor-
ganized constituencies even more than the national government”). This exception would 
seem to swallow the rule for some areas of the law. 
 26 Gerken, 124 Harv L Rev at 59 (cited in note 22). 
 27 Id at 66. 
 28 See, for example, recent voting rights cases finding that states intentionally dis-
criminated against racial minorities. Perez v Abbott, 267 F Supp 3d 750, 794–96 (WD Tex 
2017), affd in part, revd in part, and remanded, 138 S Ct 2305 (2018); North Carolina State 
Conference of the NAACP v McCrory, 831 F3d 204, 215 (4th Cir 2016). 
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state actors to be racist, nor does it depend on those actors to en-
gage in rebellion or resistance. It does not require state actors to 
intend conflict with the federal government at all. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief his-
tory of state bureaucracy, beginning with the difficulties that 
states faced in responding to the Great Depression. It describes 
how states grew their bureaucracies, both as administrators of fed-
eral laws born during the New Deal (and beyond) and as an effort 
to professionalize and regain the trust of the American people. 
Part II dives into state bureaucracies and describes the bu-
reaucratic barriers that block full administration of federal law. It 
draws from contemporary litigation against state actors to exam-
ine how noncompliance with federal laws arises. 
Part III provides a political economy account of state bureau-
cratic undermining and discusses the effects of bureaucratic un-
dermining on racial minorities and low-income populations. It ar-
gues that although state coordination problems may not reflect the 
same kind of politics as intentional resistance to federal law, they 
are nonetheless political problems. Because any successful state 
coordination requires political will, federal rights that require ex-
tensive state bureaucratic coordination can fail to reach politically 
marginalized populations that lack political power. 
Part IV surveys remedies reached in institutional suits 
against states to understand how parties and courts address and 
prevent bureaucratic undermining. These remedies—which this 
Article calls “coordination remedies”—take the form of choreogra-
phy. They differ from traditional civil rights injunctions,29 which 
essentially legislate substantive compliance with federal laws in 
considerable detail. Coordination remedies, on the other hand, 
take functional government as their goal. They create channels 
through state government by fostering integration between state 
agencies (to combat agency alienation and conflict) and role clarity 
(to combat role confusion).30 
I.  THE FALL AND RISE OF STATE BUREAUCRACY 
The story of states from the 1930s to the present is one of 
growth and professionalization. Unable to deal with the economic 
consequences of the Great Depression without significant federal 
 
 29 Professors Abram Chayes and Owen Fiss did pioneering work on the characteristics, 
promise, and pitfalls of these remedies. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge 
in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv L Rev 1281 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Civil Rights In-
junction (Indiana 1978); Owen M. Fiss, 93 Harv L Rev 1 (cited in note 19). 
 30 See Part IV. 
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help and discredited by the desegregation and civil rights battles 
of the 1950s and 1960s, states had lost the trust of the American 
people and the federal government. In more recent years, they 
have sought to regain that confidence by growing their bureaucra-
cies and professionalizing their legislatures. That effort has largely 
succeeded. States now partner with the federal government on a 
wide range of policy areas. Having shaken the image of racist pa-
rochialism, states now enjoy more protection from the judiciary 
and more open-mindedness from the academy. In short, states are 
at their largest and strongest. 
This Part briefly tells that story. The way that states have de-
veloped informs the federalism issues that affect civil rights and 
constitutional litigation today, and yet it is rarely discussed in the 
federalism scholarship. The context of this history, however, sheds 
light on a problem—the coordination problem—that I argue ex-
plains and complicates the current place of states in the federal 
system. 
The states emerged bruised from the Great Depression. Terry 
Sanford, a former governor and US senator from North Carolina, 
and former president of Duke University, described it in this way: 
[I]n the early 1930s, the depression all but submerged the 
states. The economic collapse was so massive the states could 
not feed the hungry or find jobs for the unemployed. The states 
had no means for boosting the economy or saving the banks. 
. . . 
From the viewpoint of the efficacy of state government, the 
states lost their confidence, and the people their faith in the 
states; the news media became cynical, the political scientists 
became neglectful, and the critics became harsh.31 
Compared to the states’ “reluctance and timidity,” the national 
government took “action.”32 
Americans were willing to accept a strong federal executive at 
that time, even as they had been historically more suspicious of 
 
 31 Terry Sanford, Storm over the States 20–21 (McGraw-Hill 1967). 
 32 Id at 22, citing Harold J. Laski, The Obsolescence of Federalism, 39 The New Repub-
lic 367 (May 3, 1939). See also Alice M. Rivlin, Reviving the American Dream: The Economy, 
the States & the Federal Government 92 (Brookings 1992) (describing how the states were 
unable to cope with the Great Depression and how, especially in comparison to a federal 
government augmented from its experience in World War II, some saw states as “anachro-
nisms that might eventually fade from the American governmental scene”). 
1092 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1083 
strong state executives.33 “The American governorship was con-
ceived in mistrust and born in a strait jacket, the creature of revo-
lutionary assemblies.”34 During this period of state weakness, gov-
ernors had limited power to make appointments; they presided 
over “fragmented, poorly organized” department branches and 
small staffs with limited education and professional experience.35 
At the same time, states—and especially southern states—be-
came associated with segregated schools and civil rights violations. 
The Supreme Court in the 1950s and ’60s handed down a series of 
decisions, including Brown v Board of Education of Topeka,36 that re-
quired schools to end racial segregation.37 States became “lumped to-
gether” in what became known as the “‘Alabama syndrome,’ implying 
that the conservative, racist administration of Alabama Governor 
George Wallace in the 1960s [was] the norm.”38 
State bureaucracy played a particularly important role in re-
sisting civil rights laws during that era. When Brown I came down, 
states and state officials in the South placed desegregation into the 
hands of state and local bureaucracy to give a legitimizing sheen 
to otherwise fierce efforts to prevent desegregation.39 For example, 
bureaucratic tactics included pupil reassignment laws enacted at 
the state level that allowed local bureaucrats to control student 
school change requests by applying ostensibly race-neutral factors 
 
 33 Ann O’M. Bowman and Richard C. Kearney, The Resurgence of the States 14 (Prentice-
Hall 1986). 
 34 William H. Young, The Development of the Governorship, 31 State Government 178, 
178 (1958). 
 35 Rivlin, Reviving the American Dream at 93 (cited in note 32). For a history of guber-
natorial powers generally, see Seifter, 131 Harv L Rev at 492–99 (cited in note 20). 
 36 347 US 483 (1954) (“Brown I”). 
 37 Id at 495. 
 38 Bowman and Kearney, Resurgence of the States at 1–2 (cited in note 33). See also 
Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree: What Happens When Courts Run 
Government 17 (Yale 2003) (“The image of state and local officials as villains in need of ju-
dicial correction began with the South but spread to officials across the country during the 
era of antiwar demonstrations and urban riots.”). 
 39 This was especially true when, the year after Brown I, the Supreme Court issued its 
opinion in Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 349 US 294 (1955) (“Brown II”), which 
took a more cautionary approach to the actual act of desegregation. The Court held that 
local authorities must undertake “good faith implementation” of desegregation, based on 
“local conditions,” “practical flexibility,” and “a facility for adjusting and reconciling public 
and private needs.” Id at 299–300. States must desegregate their schools not immediately, 
the Court held, but “with all deliberate speed.” Id at 301. Brown II emboldened state officers 
to continue resisting desegregation. “The overall message [of Brown II] to the South seemed 
to be that it could take as long as it wanted to desegregate schools. To many, this meant 
never.” John A. Kirk, “Massive Resistance and Minimum Compliance”: The Origins of the 1957 
Little Rock School Crisis and the Failure of School Desegregation in the South, in Clive Webb, 
ed, Massive Resistance: Southern Opposition to the Second Reconstruction 76, 81 (Oxford 2005). 
2018] State Bureaucratic Undermining 1093 
that were, in practice, crafted to preserve segregation.40 To these 
Southerners, “the path was clear: bureaucratization could accom-
plish most of what overt resistance had not.”41 
In an effort to regain trust, states began to professionalize 
their governments.42 These reforms sought to strengthen the power 
of the governor and increase the capacity of the bureaucracy. They 
included lengthening gubernatorial terms, increasing the gover-
nor’s appointment and removal powers, increasing gubernatorial 
control over the state budget, and providing additional veto pow-
ers.43 Reform efforts to streamline authority in state bureaucracy, 
however, have had mixed results. The number of state actors 
elected separately from the governor remained essentially un-
changed from 1955 to 1994.44 Scholars disagree as to whether these 
reforms have achieved their goals.45 
The sheer size of state bureaucracies has increased as well. In 
1954, state governments employed 1.1 million employees; by 2015, 
that number had increased to 5.4 million.46 Monthly payrolls in-
creased from $300.7 million to $21.6 billion.47 State bureaucrats 
have also gotten younger, more educated, and more experienced in 
public service.48 
As states reformed, they became more attractive as adminis-
trative partners for the federal government.49 In the 1930s and 
’40s, the federal government began to rely on states to administer 
 
 40 See Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, 
and the Image of American Democracy, 70 S Cal L Rev 1641, 1712–14 (1997). 
 41 Id at 1714. 
 42 See Todd E. Pettys, Our Anticompetitive Patriotism, 39 UC Davis L Rev 1353, 1389 
(2006) (noting that, after the 1950s and ’60s, “the states worked hard to regain the people’s 
trust, such as by improving their tax systems, professionalizing their staffs, and strength-
ening their governors’ powers”). 
 43 See Bowman and Kearney, Resurgence of the States at 54–65 (cited in note 33). 
 44 Thad Beyle and Margaret Ferguson, Governors and the Executive Branch, in Virginia 
Gray and Russell L. Hanson, eds, Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis 192, 
207 (CQ 9th ed 2008). 
 45 See, for example, James K. Conant, In the Shadow of Wilson and Brownlow: Execu-
tive Branch Reorganization in the States, 1965 to 1987, 48 Pub Admin Rev 892, 898 (1988) 
(noting that, although the recent spate of state bureaucratic reforms increased gubernatorial 
power over state bureaucracies, the economic efficiency and administrative effectiveness of 
those reforms remain unknown). 
 46 Council of State Governments, 49 Book of the States at 409 (cited in note 7). 
 47 Id. 
 48 See Bowman and Kearney, Resurgence of the States at 67 (cited in note 33). 
 49 See Gluck, 121 Yale L J at 552 (cited in note 22) (noting that state bureaucratic 
evolution—including the “dramatic increase in the professionalization of state agencies”—
is both “widely noted” and “made state administrators more attractive and competent im-
plementation partners”). 
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federal laws—in particular, New Deal programs like public assis-
tance laws.50 Since then, the federal government has partnered 
with the states in a wide range of policy areas: the environment, 
telecommunications, health care, and so forth.51 
State government grew as states accepted financial incentives 
from the federal government and organized their institutions to 
administer those programs. Some state agencies, created by states 
to administer federal programs, “are effectively creatures of federal 
policy.”52 Federal laws fund and shape these agencies, in part by 
funding state employee training and directing the policy mission of 
the bureaucracy.53 As Professor Abbe Gluck has noted, “Coopera-
tive federalism [ ] is a phenomenon that feeds on itself: each federal 
program that gives money and implementation authority to the 
states makes those states more reliable, and relied-upon, partners 
with the federal government.”54 In 1955, states received approxi-
mately 17 percent of their revenue from the federal government; 
that number had increased to approximately 26 percent by 1992.55 
By the late 1970s, public opinion had shifted away from the 
national government toward the states. Americans became disillu-
sioned with the federal government because of several failures at 
the federal level: the Vietnam War, the costly and perceived-as-
ineffective War on Poverty, and the Watergate scandal. The result 
of these failures was a “crisis of confidence in the national govern-
ment.”56 In one 1979 survey, only 19 percent of citizens rated the 
US Congress as “excellent” or “pretty good,” whereas 31 percent 
gave those same ratings to state legislatures.57 
Around that time, the idea of decentralizing federal policy to 
states became an important part of the political milieu. President 
Richard Nixon in the 1970s and President Ronald Reagan in the 
1980s expanded the autonomy and policymaking authority of states 
 
 50 See Weiser, 79 NC L Rev at 669 (cited in note 22). 
 51 See id at 669–70. 
 52 Roderick M. Hills Jr, The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 
Stan L Rev 1225, 1236 (2001). 
 53 Id at 1236–37. 
 54 Gluck, 121 Yale L J at 552 (cited in note 22). See also John P. Dwyer, The Practice 
of Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 Md L Rev 1183, 1221–24 (1995) (noting that, even 
by 1970, state bureaucracies were incapable of developing effective environmental policies, 
but that, since then, “federal funding and federal environmental legislation have promoted 
the development and growth of state environmental bureaucracies and expertise”). 
 55 See Russell L. Hanson, Intergovernmental Relations, in Virginia Gray and Herbert 
Jacob, eds, Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis 35, 54 (CQ 6th ed 1996). 
 56 Bowman and Kearney, Resurgence of the States at 11–12 (cited in note 33). 
 57 Id at 12. 
2018] State Bureaucratic Undermining 1095 
and local governments by converting some categorical grants—fed-
eral funding that required states to perform detailed policy tasks—
to more open-ended block grants.58 This “New Federalism” rested on 
“a respectful vision of local government as competent to make in-
telligent choices about local needs.”59 
As states have grown and professionalized, the judiciary has 
shielded them from federal interference. By the 1990s, “the idea of 
states’ rights was no longer a shibboleth for segregation,” and con-
servative justices became concerned that a strong federal govern-
ment overly undermined state autonomy.60 
The Supreme Court has diminished the federal government’s 
authority to direct state action in at least five ways, resulting in a 
“rollback of federal legislative power.”61 First, it restricted Congress’s 
ability to use the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent state-based dis-
crimination. In a series of cases beginning in the 1990s, the Supreme 
Court struck down provisions of federal civil rights laws—enacted 
pursuant to Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement au-
thority62—that sought to prevent state discrimination on the basis 
of religion,63 age,64 disability,65 and gender.66 Second, the Court lim-
ited Congress’s once nearly plenary authority to enact legislation 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.67 Third, the anticommandeer-
ing doctrine limited the actions Congress could force states to take 
 
 58 Rivlin, Reviving the American Dream at 101–02 (cited in note 32). 
 59 Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting 
for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 Colum L Rev 552, 570 (1999). 
 60 Eskridge, 100 Mich L Rev at 2319 (cited in note 18). 
 61 Id. 
 62 For a general discussion of this line of cases, see Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal 
Protection, 124 Harv L Rev 747, 768–73 (2011) (discussing the history of Congress’s Com-
merce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority and the cases limiting 
them); Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five 
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L J 1943, 
1952–66 (2003) (discussing the Court’s constriction of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment 
lawmaking authority). 
 63 See City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507, 511 (1997) (striking down the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993). 
 64 See Kimel v Florida Board of Regents, 528 US 62, 67 (2000) (striking down the pro-
vision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 that created state liability for 
state-based employment discrimination on the basis of age). 
 65 See Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v Garrett, 531 US 356, 360 (2001) 
(striking down the provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 that created 
state liability for state-based discrimination on the basis of disability). 
 66 See United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 619–27 (2000) (striking down the provi-
sion of the Violence against Women Act of 1994 that created civil liability for gender-moti-
vated violence as beyond Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power). 
 67 The Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, United States v 
Lopez, 514 US 549, 551, 567–68 (1995), and a provision of the Violence against Women Act 
of 1994, Morrison, 529 US at 607–19, as exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. 
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to administer federal law.68 Fourth, the Court limited Congress’s 
ability to coerce states to take action by threatening to remove fed-
eral funding.69 Finally, the Court limited the ways that Congress 
could use federal law to dictate how states organize their internal 
subdivisions.70 
The Supreme Court has also limited the remedies available to 
plaintiffs to correct civil rights violations by states. During the civil 
rights era of the 1960s and early ’70s, remedies against states took 
the form of massive consent decrees and injunctions, hundreds of 
pages long, that essentially legislated substantive compliance with 
federal laws in considerable detail.71 These cases sought “total 
transformation[ ]” and “reconstruction of an ongoing social institu-
tion,” and were the first cases to grapple with “a new unit of con-
stitutional law—the state bureaucracy.”72 
 
For a general discussion of this line of cases and the ways in which Lopez and Morrison dimin-
ished Congress’s lawmaking authority, see John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: 
The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 Cal L Rev 485, 511–16 (2002). 
 68 See Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 925–33 (1997) (striking down a part of the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required state and local law enforcement officers 
to conduct a background check on prospective handgun buyers); New York v United States, 
505 US 144, 151–54, 161 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot compel a state “to enact and 
enforce a federal regulatory program” and striking down a federal statute that forced states 
to take title to low-level radioactive waste unless the state was able to dispose of that 
waste—either itself or through an interstate compact—by a certain date), quoting Hodel v 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc, 452 US 264, 288 (1981). 
 69 See National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 567 US 519, 575–85 
(2012) (holding that Congress could not coerce the states to expand their Medicaid programs 
by threatening to take away their existing Medicaid funding). See also Fahey, 128 Harv L 
Rev at 1587–89 (cited in note 21) (describing the development of the coercion doctrine). 
 70 See Nixon v Missouri Municipal League, 541 US 125, 129, 140 (2004) (holding that 
the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not preempt a Missouri law that regulated 
its subdivisions because of the “working assumption that federal legislation threatening to 
trench on the States’ arrangements for conducting their own governments should be treated 
with great skepticism, and read in a way that preserves a State’s chosen disposition of its 
own power”); Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 460–61 (1991) (holding that federal law dis-
rupting the traditional federal-state balance—which includes permitting the states to struc-
ture their government as they see fit—must make a “plain statement” of its intention to do 
so because “[t]hrough the structure of its government . . . a State defines itself as a sover-
eign”). See also Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in 
an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 Va L Rev 959, 984–90 (2007) (describing the doctrine of state 
control over its subdivisions). 
 71 See Fiss, 93 Harv L Rev at 23–24 (cited in note 19). Scholars termed these docu-
ments “civil rights injunctions” or “structural injunctions,” and they emerged from the de-
segregation cases that followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown I. Structural reform 
cases spread from school desegregation to a wider variety of state institutions: police, pris-
ons, psychiatric hospitals, and public assistance programs. See id at 2–4 (cited in note 19). 
See also Sandler and Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree at 45–46, 63 (cited in note 38) (de-
scribing two consent decrees that totaled 515 pages in a lawsuit designed to reform New 
York City’s special education program). 
 72 See Fiss, 93 Harv L Rev at 3–4 (cited in note 19). 
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From the late 1970s through the ’90s, the Supreme Court cir-
cumscribed its previous broad approval of these remedies.73 Public 
law remedies began to take a lighter touch; instead of manually 
reforming state institutions, they set forth procedures for reaching 
substantive compliance. These decrees “emphasize broad goals and 
leave the defendants substantial latitude to determine how to 
achieve them; mandate precise measurement and reporting with 
respect to achievement; and institutionalize ongoing mechanisms 
of reassessment, discipline, and participation.”74 
No case better illustrates the broad idea that newly well-behaved 
states deserve greater protection from the federal government than 
Shelby County v Holder.75 There, the Supreme Court disabled § 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965,76 long one of the most effective and 
transformative civil rights statutes in America’s history.77 Section 5 
required some state and local governments to get preapproval 
(“preclearance”) for any change to their elections system, from re-
districting to changing a polling place.78 Section 5 targeted those 
jurisdictions with histories of voting discrimination—largely, but 
not all, southern jurisdictions.79 Although the Court had repeatedly 
upheld the constitutionality of § 5 and the coverage formula,80 in 
2013 it held that “[t]hings have changed dramatically” in the 
South.81 
As the image of states has softened and grown distant from 
ineptitude, segregation, and intransigent rights violations, aca-
demic scholarship on the place of states in the federal system has 
softened as well. In the 1970s, several influential scholars pro-
moted lawsuits against states and state bureaucracy that forced 
 
 73 See id at 4–5 (describing how the Burger Court mounted a “counterassault” against 
structural injunctions); Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the 
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 Harv L Rev 465, 472–73 (1980) (noting that 
federalism doctrines that protect state institutions from federal interference “flourishe[d] in 
federal courthouses”). 
 74 Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv L Rev 1016, 1032 (2004). 
 75 570 US 529 (2013). 
 76 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, codified as amended at 52 USC § 10101 et seq. 
 77 See Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own 
Success?, 104 Colum L Rev 1710, 1712–14 (2004). 
 78 Shelby County, 570 US at 537. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See Lopez v Monterey County, 525 US 266, 282–83 (1999); City of Rome v United 
States, 446 US 156, 173–78 (1980); Georgia v United States, 411 US 526, 536–39 (1973). 
 81 Shelby County, 570 US at 547.  
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significant structural reform.82 By the 1980s, however, liberal de-
fenders of structural lawsuits against states had taken on an “anx-
ious tone.”83 These scholars worried about the costs to state sover-
eignty and the judicial legitimacy of structural injunctions that cut 
deeply into the workings of state government.84 More recently, fed-
eralism scholars on the left have argued that state resistance to 
the federal government actually creates productive discourse 
around national policymaking—rather than creating civil rights 
crises—and ultimately serves nationalist ends.85 
States have thus rebounded. State governments are larger 
than ever, in part because of the federal funding they receive to 
administer federal programs and in part because of an effort to 
professionalize state government and regain trust. As a conse-
quence, states also enjoy more legal protections than they have in 
years. 
II.  BUREAUCRATIC BARRIERS 
We arrive, therefore, at a high point in state government. 
Amidst a growing and professionalizing state bureaucracy and re-
newed respect for state sovereignty, states are now responsible for 
administering more federal law than ever.86 And yet state bureau-
cracy, especially as it operates to administer federal law, remains 
something of a mystery. 
This Part examines one aspect of that administration: how 
state actors must coordinate to comply with federal law.87 Any fed-
eral law that uses states as administrators requires states to take 
 
 82 See Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction at 91–95 (cited in note 29); Chayes, 89 Harv L 
Rev at 1284, 1288–1304 (cited in note 29); Fiss, 93 Harv L Rev at 28–38 (cited in note 19). 
 83 Sabel and Simon, 117 Harv L Rev at 1018 (cited in note 74). 
 84 See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L J 585, 676–80 (1983); William 
A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legiti-
macy, 91 Yale L J 635, 649 (1982). 
 85 See Bulman-Pozen and Gerken, 118 Yale L J at 1284–91 (cited in note 22). 
 86 See, for example, Weinstein-Tull, 117 Colum L Rev at 847–64 (cited in note 7) (de-
scribing the state role in administering federal election, public assistance, indigent defense, 
prison condition, and education laws); Gluck, 121 Yale L J at 582–94 (cited in note 22) (de-
scribing the various state roles in administering federal health care law); Weiser, 79 NC L 
Rev at 668–81 (cited in note 22) (describing the rise of cooperative-federalism programs that 
use states to administer federal public assistance, health care, environmental, and telecom-
munications laws). 
 87 Throughout, I use “federal right” and “federal law” largely interchangeably. This 
Article is primarily concerned with federal laws that seek to enfranchise, empower, or pro-
vide a benefit or civil right. 
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action. Federal election laws require states to offer voter registra-
tion opportunities at state offices.88 Federal environmental laws re-
quire states to achieve federal environmental goals.89 Federal pub-
lic assistance laws require states to administer welfare and 
assistance programs.90 And so on. 
The forms of these policies vary. Federal statutes include both 
Spending Clause laws, which offer federal dollars to states for ad-
ministering federal policy,91 and unfunded federal mandates, 
which require states to take action on their own without any finan-
cial incentive.92 Constitutional mandates on states do not treat 
states as administrators, exactly, but still require states to take 
action and therefore implicate intrastate coordination. These man-
dates include the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the 
Eighth Amendment constraints on prison conditions.93 
States decentralize their powers, so complying with these laws 
requires intrastate coordination. I treat coordination broadly in 
this Article: a federal law implicates intrastate coordination when-
ever it requires more than one state actor to take action and when-
ever at least one state actor relies on another to achieve full com-
pliance. The actual substance of coordination can take different 
forms. It may take the form of coercion: one state actor exercising 
power over another, especially when the two actors do not share a 
common purpose.94 But coordination may also be another term for 
 
 88 See notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
 89 See Dwyer, 54 Md L Rev at 1184–85, 1209–10 (cited in note 54) (noting that the 
Clean Air Act and other federal environmental statutes require state action in exchange for 
federal funding); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 NYU L Rev 698, 
715–16 (2011). 
 90 See Weiser, 79 NC L Rev at 668–69 (cited in note 22) (noting that most federal public 
assistance programs offer states funding in exchange for state administration of the program). 
 91 Like federal public assistance laws, for example. See id. 
 92 See, for example, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-336, 
104 Stat 327, codified at 42 USC § 12101 et seq. 
 93 I share Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen Yeazell’s skepticism that the source 
of the obligation should affect the extent of a court’s enforcement authority. See Eisenberg and 
Yeazell, 93 Harv L Rev at 488 (cited in note 73): 
To the extent that institutional litigation is viewed as questionable because judges 
lack the capacity and resources to make policy for large institutions and to super-
vise their administration, it is difficult to understand why the existence of a rele-
vant statute would make a difference. A legislative enactment does not magically 
enhance judges’ administrative and policymaking abilities. 
That said, the source of the obligation will determine the enforcement structure. Whereas a 
constitutional guarantee is likely to be enforced by private actors, federal statutes may be 
enforced privately, cooperatively through interactions with federal agencies, or through fed-
eral enforcement litigation. The nature of the remedy will vary as well if the federal statutes 
specify what remedial measures are appropriate. 
 94 See Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementation at 133–35 (cited in note 14). 
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“consent”: a process of bargaining and agreement between two ac-
tors that may share common purpose but disagree on means.95 
Whether coordination takes the form of coercion or consent de-
pends on the power relationship between the actors.96 The interac-
tion may be hierarchical or nonhierarchical. Hierarchical relation-
ships exist when one state actor has clear state-law authority to 
coerce another to take the action necessary for compliance, as be-
tween a state and its local government, for example. Hierarchical 
relationships are often not as clear as state law suggests, however.97 
Nonhierarchical relationships exist between two actors with 
an indeterminate power relationship: between two cabinet mem-
bers, for example, or between a governor and a state commission 
whose members are appointed by nongubernatorial actors. Two ac-
tors in nonhierarchical relationships often answer to different con-
stituencies, and they may be of different political parties or possess 
conflicting policy and political ambitions.98 And because state law 
does not provide a clear line of authority between these actors, con-
flicts between them may be intractable without intervention. 
With these baseline concepts in mind, this Part uses examples 
of conflict and coordination between state actors to set out the to-
pography and typology of state bureaucratic barriers. The topogra-
phy describes the relationships between state actors that federal 
rights demand: interagency, interbranch, and state-local. The ty-
pology characterizes the kinds of bureaucratic roadblocks that 
arise—alienation between state actors, conflict between state ac-
tors, and role confusion—and explains how these barriers differ 
from those that arise in the federal bureaucracy. 
 
 95 Id at 134. 
 96 I draw here from Professors Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph O’Connell’s deep re-
search on federal interagency conflicts. They provide a helpful typology of four kinds of fed-
eral administrative relationships: hard hierarchical, soft hierarchal, monitoring, and sym-
metrical. See Farber and O’Connell, 105 Cal L Rev at 1389 (cited in note 20). I adapt their 
framework to focus on hierarchical and nonhierarchical relationships. 
 97 In a case against Alabama for failing to transmit ballots to military and overseas 
voters, the state claimed it was powerless to force local election authorities to comply with 
the federal law. It claimed that “[i]f a local official refuses to cooperate or provide infor-
mation to the Secretary of State, the Secretary has no authority to compel the action of a 
local official.” The state claimed that “persuasion” was sometimes effective, “but the fact 
remains that the Secretary cannot be in 67 counties at once, and cannot compel a local offi-
cial to mail a ballot by a particular date.” State Defendants’ Response to the United States’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Declaratory Judgment, and Permanent Injunctive Relief, 
United States v Alabama, No 2:12-cv-00179, *5 (MD Ala filed Dec 4, 2013). 
 98 When both are elected, cabinet-level officials, for example. 
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A. Topography 
This Section maps the state bodies—the topographical fea-
tures of the state terrain—that must coordinate to comply with fed-
eral laws. It provides examples of the kinds of laws that require 
coordination and describes how those laws give rise to conflict—
that is, coordination problems—between state actors. 
1. Interagency. 
States decentralize their power in multiple ways, even at the 
horizontal, state government level. Unlike the federal government, 
states largely have not adopted the unitary executive model. In 
2017, thirty-five states elected their secretaries of state separately 
from their governor.99 Forty-four states separately elected their at-
torney general.100 State government is also populated by commis-
sions, created by executives and legislatures, with authority over 
state policymaking.101 Because those commissioners can be ap-
pointed by a variety of state actors, they may be politically insu-
lated and cause coordination troubles. 
Federal rights often require multiple independent executive 
officers—sometimes of different political parties—to coordinate 
with each other. Conflict between those officers can create barriers 
to full compliance with federal law.102 Conflict can arise for many 
 
 99 See Council of State Governments, 49 Book of the States at 189–94 (cited in note 7). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See Seifter, 131 Harv L Rev at 512–15 (cited in note 20) (describing the legal ambi-
guities of state independent agencies, their relationships with governors, and the lack of 
contemporary literature on these agencies). For a similar discussion at the federal level, see 
generally Jennifer Nou, Governing Agencies (unpublished manuscript, 2017) (on file with 
author) (describing the many types of governing structures of independent agencies at the 
federal level). 
 102 Most scholarship on interagency disputes has looked at the relationship between 
governors and state attorneys general. See generally, for example, William P. Marshall, 
Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided 
Executive, 115 Yale L J 2446 (2006); Note, Appointing State Attorneys General: Evaluating 
the Unbundled State Executive, 127 Harv L Rev 973 (2014). That relationship does tend to 
create high-profile disputes, in part because the two are prominent political offices with 
built-in structural incentives to compete. See Marshall, 115 Yale L J at 2453 (noting that 
the state attorney general position is often a stepping stone to the governorship and that 
political incentives may encourage disputes between those two officers whether they share 
a political party or not).  
 More recent scholarship has examined how some cooperative-federalism programs re-
quire state actors to work together to consent to the federal program in the first place and 
how the federal government works around conflicts between state actors to implement the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA). See Fahey, 128 Harv at 1572–82 (cited in note 21) (describing 
the variety of consent procedures employed by cooperative-federalism programs that require 
the participation of various state actors); Fahey, 125 Yale L J F at 59–64 (cited in note 21) 
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reasons, further described below,103 including legitimate disagree-
ments about policy and political incentives to take adverse positions. 
As an example, return to the NVRA, which requires coordina-
tion among several state actors. Each state must designate a “chief 
State election official to be responsible for coordination of State 
[NVRA] responsibilities.”104 Many states have designated their sec-
retaries of state in that role.105 Actual compliance with the NVRA, 
however, brings in other state actors by requiring public assistance 
agencies, disability services offices, and DMV offices to register ap-
plicants to vote.106 But secretaries of state do not administer those 
offices: public assistance offices and state disability services offices 
are administered by other cabinet-level directors. Those directors 
are often appointed by governors—forty-one state social services 
agency directors are107—but can be appointed by commissions, 
agency heads, or cabinet directors as well.108 Still another state of-
ficial administers DMV offices. None of these actors is subject to 
the authority of the secretary of state. 
The NVRA implicates horizontal interagency conflicts at the 
local level as well. Because California’s elections system is highly 
decentralized—voter registration happens at the local level—and 
because local public assistance and DMV offices collect the voter 
registration forms, those local agencies must coordinate with local 
registrars’ offices to deliver the forms.109 This kind of coordination 
may seem mundane—it is—but it is a barrier that has prevented 
full compliance with the NVRA in California.110 
 
(describing how federal bureaucrats found ways to work with state insurance commission-
ers to expand state administration of the ACA even in the face of governors wanting no part 
in the program). 
 103 See Part II.B. 
 104 52 USC § 20509. 
 105 National Conference of State Legislatures, Election Administration at State and Lo-
cal Levels (cited in note 11) (noting that twenty-four states have designated their secretary 
of state as the state’s chief election official). 
 106 See 52 USC §§ 20504 (motor vehicle offices), 20506 (public assistance offices and 
disability services offices). 
 107 Council of State Governments, 49 Book of the States at 189–94 (cited in note 7). 
 108 Id. 
 109 Alternatively, California could require its public assistance and DMV offices to 
transmit those voter registration forms to their central state offices, which would then 
transmit them to local county registrars, most likely through the state secretary of state’s 
office. That pathway has its own coordination demand. 
 110 Interview with Raúl Luévano Macías, Attorney, ACLU of Northern California (Sept 
16, 2016) (on file with author) (“Macías Interview”). 
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2. Interbranch. 
Compliance with some federal rights requires coordination be-
tween state executives and legislatures. That is, executives rely on 
legislative action to comply with these rights. Compliance with the 
right may require the state legislature to provide funding, or it may 
require the legislature to amend state law to empower the bureau-
cracy to administer the right. 
Many federal obligations on states cost money. Some—those 
derived from cooperative-federalism programs like food stamps—
come with federal money that states receive for agreeing to imple-
ment the program.111 Other rights, however, require states to foot 
the bill. The NVRA, for example, is a right (and obligation on 
states) that the federal government does not fully fund.112 The 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel—and obligation on states to 
provide counsel—similarly requires states to provide funding.113 
State executives’ reliance on state legislative funding some-
times plays out in public. A recent example: the Montana Public 
Defender Commission wrote an article in the Great Falls Tribune 
discussing the challenges of maintaining a statewide agency re-
sponsible for providing counsel to indigent criminal defendants.114 
The Commission, composed of individuals appointed by a mix of 
state actors—the Montana Supreme Court, the state bar, the sen-
ate president, etc.115—noted the budget challenges it faced116 and 
stated that it was “committed to working with the governor’s office 
and the legislature during the upcoming session to assure that the 
 
 111 See Weiser, 79 NC L Rev at 668–69 (cited in note 22) (describing the funding struc-
ture of cooperative-federalism programs). 
 112 The NVRA provides no funding. The Help America Vote Act, Pub L No 107-252, 116 
Stat 1666, provides some election administration funding, but it is “quite limited”; states 
and local governments bear the financial burden of funding elections, including compliance 
with the NVRA. See Alec C. Ewald, The Way We Vote: The Local Dimension of American 
Suffrage 4 (Vanderbilt 2009). 
 113 See Drinan, 33 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 429–30, 464–66 (cited in note 6) (noting 
that problems with indigent defense stem from funding issues, which are problems of state 
legislatures). States take a variety of approaches: nineteen states require their local govern-
ments to either fully fund or provide most of the funding for indigent criminal defense; fewer 
than half of the states fully fund their indigent defense systems. Holly R. Stevens, et al, 
State, County and Local Expenditures for Indigent Defense Services Fiscal Year 2008, *5 
(American Bar Association, Nov 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/48Q5-S64Y. 
 114 Office of the State Public Defender Commission, Montana Public Defenders Com-
mission Propose Funding Help (Great Falls Tribune, Dec 29, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZW5U-LHXB. 
 115 Public Defender Commission Membership (Office of the State Public Defender, Oct 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/9Z5Q-AKRL.  
 116 See Office of the State Public Defender Commission, Montana Public Defenders 
Commission Propose Funding Help (cited in note 114) (“[I]ncreases in workload are not ad-
dressed through corresponding increases in funding, staff or attorneys.”). 
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public defender system continues to function efficiently, and admi-
rably to fulfill this legal representation obligation.”117 Other state-
level public assistance administrators have made similar pleas for 
additional funding from state legislatures in recent years.118 
State executive officials can feel hamstrung by state law out-
side the context of budgetary constraints as well. They commonly 
argue in litigation that they cannot be responsible for noncompli-
ance with a federal right because they are not empowered by state 
law to administer it.119 Whether officials make those arguments in 
good or bad faith is difficult to determine. I have encountered what 
I believe to be good faith iterations of the argument in litigation. 
Either way, federal rights that demand interbranch coordination 
permit states to avoid compliance for some time by playing this 
game of liability hot potato.120 
3. State-local. 
Federal law can also require coordination between states and 
their local governments. States often delegate (and, in some cases, 
abdicate)121 their federal responsibilities to local governments. When 
that happens, local governments play the role of state agencies.122 
 
 117 Id. 
 118 See, for example, a letter written by the director of the Missouri State Public Defender 
(MSPD) system to the Missouri governor, stating that MSPD was unable to perform its job 
without additional funding and taking the extraordinary and elegant step of appointing the 
governor as a public defender. Matt Ford, A Governor Ordered to Serve as a Public Defender 
(The Atlantic, Aug 4, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/NQU2-SCGK. See also, for example, 
Idaho Governor Butch Otter, who publicly asked his state legislature for funding to provide 
adequate indigent defense counsel after being sued for statewide violations of the Sixth 
Amendment. KBOI News Staff, Gov. Butch Otter Seeking Nearly 8 Percent Increase in Ed-
ucation Budget (KBOI News, Jan 11, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/EL2K-3ANG 
(“Please join me in a commitment to ensuring that all Idaho citizens in every one of our 44 
counties can avail themselves of this fundamental constitutional right. My budget recom-
mends $5 million to implement the changes that you approve.”). 
 119 See Weinstein-Tull, 117 Colum L Rev at 870–71 (cited in note 7). 
 120 See id at 871–72. 
 121 See generally id (describing how states delegate responsibilities to local govern-
ments, cease monitoring local compliance with those responsibilities, and then disclaim ul-
timate responsibility themselves). 
 122 See generally id (describing local administration of state responsibilities in the elec-
tion law, indigent defense, prison administration, public assistance, and education con-
texts). See also Briffault, 90 Colum L Rev at 7 (cited in note 7) (“The formal legal status of 
a local government in relation to its state is summarized by the three concepts of ‘creature,’ 
‘delegate’ and ‘agent.’”); Aaron Saiger, Local Government as a Choice of Agency Form, 77 
Ohio St L J 423, 431–33 (2016) (describing the conceptual similarities between local govern-
ments and state agencies). 
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Local governments are quirky hybrids. They have no place in 
the constitutional structure,123 and yet they are the governments 
that lie closest to people’s everyday lives.124 Legally, they are crea-
tions of their states.125 But they are also, in many respects, inde-
pendent actors that exercise their own autonomy.126 
Further, local governments often operate with little oversight 
from their state creators. Professor Richard Briffault, who built the 
scaffolding that supports much local government scholarship, has 
observed that state-local delegations of authority are “often quite 
broad and [ ] rarely revoked. In most states, local governments op-
erate in major policy areas without significant external legislative, 
administrative, or judicial supervision.”127 Despite being creations 
of the state in theory, local governments “function as representa-
tives of local constituencies and not as field offices for state bureau-
cracies” in practice.128 Because of the variety of legal frameworks 
that states employ to organize their local governments, however, 
state-local interactions are wildly diverse across the country and 
difficult to characterize holistically.129 
 
 123 Local governments are not mentioned in the Constitution. See Richard Thompson 
Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 Harv L Rev 1841, 
1864 (1994) (“Local government exists in a netherworld of shifting and indeterminate legal 
status.”); Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Govern-
ment: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis L Rev 83, 85 (“This Article’s 
basic thesis concerning the constitutional vulnerability of cities begins from the fact that 
cities—unlike the states or federal government—have no set place in the American consti-
tutional structure.”). 
 124 See David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 
147 U Pa L Rev 487, 491 (1999). 
 125 See Hunter v City of Pittsburgh, 207 US 161, 178 (1907) (noting that local govern-
ments are “subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of 
the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them”). 
 126 Professor Richard Schragger has described the existence of a “‘shadow doctrine’ that 
treats localities as sovereign political entities entitled to constitutional protection.” Richard 
C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore and the Political Currency of 
Local Government, 50 Buff L Rev 393, 396 (2002). See also Briffault, 90 Colum L Rev at 85–
86 (cited in note 7): 
Without according local governments formal constitutional rights against their 
states, the Court has affirmed the importance of localism in our political culture. 
The Court has treated localities as active, locally responsive governments, not just 
administrative arms of the states. The Court has endorsed the appropriateness of 
local decision-making and has frequently promoted localism and protected the 
considerable autonomy local governments enjoy under state law. 
 127 Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Con-
temporary Federalism, 47 Vand L Rev 1303, 1318 (1994). 
 128 Id. 
 129 See generally Dale Krane, Platon N. Rigos, and Melvin B. Hill Jr, Home Rule in 
America: A Fifty-State Handbook (CQ 2001) (describing the wide variety of state-local rela-
tionships in America, varying from highly centralized states that largely retain power over 
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Given both the independence of local governments from their 
states and the significant ways that states rely on local govern-
ments as administrators, state-local coordination problems arise 
frequently in the context of federal rights. States administer many 
of their federal public assistance responsibilities, such as food 
stamps, Medicaid, and cash assistance programs, by delegating 
those duties to local governments.130 States also delegate many 
election administration responsibilities, such as voter registration 
and absentee balloting, to local governments.131 
In other areas, federal standards govern existing state pro-
grams already administered by local governments. States don’t ex-
plicitly delegate their responsibilities under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990132 (ADA), for example, but because local 
government jails can house state prisoners who may require ac-
commodations for disabilities, local governments end up adminis-
tering the ADA.133 Similarly, states don’t always explicitly delegate 
their obligations under the Sixth Amendment to provide counsel to 
indigent criminal defendants, but because local prosecutors admin-
ister and enforce state criminal laws, many local governments end 
up funding compliance with the Sixth Amendment.134 
These state-local delegations increase the coordination burden 
on the state executive. To achieve statewide compliance, states 
must monitor local compliance with these federal laws. But once 
 
local governments to highly decentralized states that delegate broad powers to independent 
local governments). 
 130 See, for example, Heather Hahn, et al, A Descriptive Study of County- versus State-
Administered Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Programs *65 (Department of 
Health and Human Services, May 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2LKP-FFRQ (noting 
that about half of the states surveyed delegate their administrative responsibilities under 
the federal cash assistance program to local governments). 
 131 See Weinstein-Tull, 114 Mich L Rev at 778–80 (cited in note 6) (describing extensive 
state delegations to local government in the elections context). 
 132 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327, codified at 42 USC § 12101 et seq. 
 133 See Weinstein-Tull, 117 Colum L Rev at 852–55 (cited in note 7). In recent years, 
for example, California has given county jails jurisdiction over certain state prisoners in an 
effort to reduce the state prison population. See Joan Petersilia, California Prison Downsiz-
ing and Its Impact on Local Criminal Justice Systems, 8 Harv L & Pol Rev 327, 332–34 
(2014) (describing “realignment” and detailing the number of state prisoners handled by 
county jails as a consequence of this initiative). 
 134 As noted above, nineteen states require their local governments to provide all or 
most of the funding for indigent criminal defense, and fewer than half of the states fully 
fund their indigent defense system. See note 113. Even states that fully or partly fund their 
indigent defense systems delegate significant administrative responsibilities to their local 
governments. See generally Stevens, et al, State, County and Local Expenditures for Indi-
gent Defense Services Fiscal Year 2008 (cited in note 113). 
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delegated, states will deny that they remain responsible and dis-
claim responsibility for local noncompliance.135 Ensuring statewide 
compliance requires the state to engage in extensive trainings, 
closely monitor local governments, and possibly fund expensive 
government programs. And local administrators, who may be sep-
arately elected by their own local constituents, often resist strong 
state oversight. Moreover, only a small number of federal laws that 
straddle state-local relationships acknowledge and accommodate 
that additional coordination burden.136 
On the flip side, the state-local relationship implicates coordi-
nation when local governments rely on state government to provide 
them with information crucial to administering a federal right. So 
in Armstrong v Schwarzenegger,137 for example, California had 
failed to transmit to local jails disability information about prison-
ers, making it impossible for those local jails to comply with the 
ADA.138 A similar information-sharing problem can arise in the 
context of the Help America Vote Act of 2002,139 which requires 
both that states maintain a current voter registration list140 and 
that a state or local official verify whether a provisionally cast bal-
lot should be counted, based on current registration status.141 This 
postelection verification cannot happen if the state does not main-
tain an accurate voter list or if it fails to make that list available 
to local officials. 
Coordination difficulties like these have resulted in noncom-
pliance in the context of all the federal policy areas mentioned 
above. Because states resist responsibility for the actions of their 
local governments—even in the context of explicit federal obliga-
tions on states—litigation against states for local noncompliance 
can last years.142 And courts are inconsistent in how and whether 
 
 135 See Weinstein-Tull, 117 Colum L Rev at 847–64 (cited in note 7) (describing these 
state arguments in a wide variety of federal policy areas). 
 136 For example, the Food Stamp Act accounts for states that decentralize their system 
of public assistance administration by broadly defining “state agency” under the statute to 
include “the local offices thereof, which ha[ve] the responsibility for the administration of the 
federally aided public assistance programs within such State.” 7 USC § 2012(s). Medicaid im-
poses monitoring requirements on states that delegate administrative responsibilities to 
local governments. See 42 CFR § 435.903. 
 137 622 F3d 1058 (9th Cir 2010). 
 138 Id at 1063–64, 1074. 
 139 Pub L No 107-252, 116 Stat 1666. 
 140 52 USC § 21083(a). 
 141 52 USC § 21082(a). 
 142 See, for example, Duncan v Michigan, 832 NW2d 761, 765–66, 778 (Mich App 2013) 
(describing the procedural history of a Sixth Amendment case against the state of Michigan 
for local noncompliance in which resolution of state-local coordination difficulties caused a 
trial on the merits to be delayed by almost six years). 
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they find state liability for local noncompliance, making these co-
ordination problems difficult to resolve.143 
B. Typology 
In this Section, I canvass the barriers that arise within the 
terrain of state coordination and find that state bureaucracy can 
frustrate federal rights in three primary coordination-related 
ways. First, state actors and agencies can become alienated from 
one another and fail to communicate to achieve compliance. Sec-
ond, state actors can be in conflict with one another and refuse to 
coordinate. Third, state actors may not be aware of the roles they 
must play as administrators and either crowd each other out or 
neglect the federal rights altogether. 
These are not complicated concepts, but they also aren’t widely 
observed. Intrastate unrest is difficult to detect in litigation be-
cause agencies are often codefendants, not direct adversaries, and 
they are often represented by the same state attorney general. Out-
side of litigation, agencies rarely air their dirty laundry publicly, 
and even if they did, state-level press is particularly weak.144 The 
public is rarely privy to conflicts between state agencies.145 
1. Alienation. 
In 2014, the Pew Charitable Trusts set out to research and 
publicize the effectiveness of the Motor Voter law—one part of the 
NVRA—twenty-one years after it was passed.146 Instead of issuing 
a report containing statistics and compliance numbers, as it had 
hoped, Pew concluded that systematic study of Motor Voter com-
pliance was impossible because of “deep and varied problems with 
the data (including how and if it [was] collected).”147 Pew found that 
state officials were largely unaware of whether their motor vehicle 
agencies complied with the NVRA and unable to provide accurate 
compliance numbers.148 
In other words, agency alienation prevented Pew from as-
sessing compliance with the NVRA. Before the NVRA, election of-
ficials and motor vehicle officials, housed in separate parts of the 
state, had no reason to work together. They have different (and 
 
 143 See Weinstein-Tull, 117 Colum L Rev at 866–68 (cited in note 7). 
 144 See Seifter, 131 Harv L Rev at 525 (cited in note 20). 
 145 Id at 523–25. 
 146 Pew Charitable Trusts, Measuring Motor Voter *1 (May 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L4PK-UWKK. 
 147 Id at *2. 
 148 Id. 
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rarely compatible) data systems, which makes integration and, ul-
timately, compliance difficult.149 Reaching a similar conclusion, the 
nonpartisan Presidential Commission on Election Administration 
stated that “Motor Voter is not working as intended” and noted 
that the absence of integrated registration information played a 
large role.150 
Interestingly, Michigan is one of the only states that, prior to 
the NVRA, happened to house elections officials and motor vehicle 
officials inside a single state agency: the office of the secretary of 
state.151 It is no surprise, then, that both Pew and the Presidential 
Commission on Election Administration praised Michigan’s Motor 
Voter compliance as “seamless” and for “streamlin[ing] the voter 
registration process for the motor vehicle agency” by “reducing 
transaction times, standardizing names and addresses,” and im-
proving user experience.152 
The NVRA offers even more opportunities for alienation. As 
described above, for most states, NVRA compliance sprawls across 
state government both horizontally and vertically.153 It also 
sprawls diagonally. Depending on how the state has set up NVRA 
administration, state-level election officials may need to coordinate 
with local-level motor vehicle and public assistance agencies. So 
even if state-level election officials are in communication with 
other state-level directors, they may be alienated from local-level 
administrators outside of their control. This was recently a prob-
lem in California, where local public assistance offices ignored the 
secretary of state and instead looked for guidance from their own 
state-level directors.154 
Organizational theory suggests that intra- and interagency al-
ienation, and a general disconnect between agency heads and low-
level administrators, is a feature of complex institutions.155 Profes-
sor Joanna Schwartz, drawing from this literature, has disputed 
 
 149 See id. 
 150 Presidential Commission on Election Administration, American Voting Experience 
at *17, 30 (cited in note 6) (calling the NVRA the “most often ignored” election law statute). 
 151 Pew Charitable Trusts, Measuring Motor Voter at *7 (cited in note 146). 
 152 Id; Presidential Commission on Election Administration, American Voting Experi-
ence at *30 (cited in note 6) (noting that Michigan “seamlessly integrate[s] the Motor Voter 
transaction into the DMV driver’s license application program in such a manner as to keep 
a large number of voter records current”). 
 153 See notes 104–10 and accompanying text. 
 154 Macías Interview (cited in note 110). 
 155 Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection through Litigation, 90 Notre Dame L Rev 1055, 1060. 
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the idea that complex organizations are always aware of noncom-
pliance in the organization.156 Because “information [within com-
plex organizations] is decentralized and held by a number of dif-
ferent people and entities,” and because “gaps in [organizational] 
design and implementation can frustrate information collection ef-
forts,” “those at the highest levels of governance may not learn about 
incidents of wrongdoing or critical details of those incidents.”157 
Agency alienation is a problem that is particularly acute at the 
state, rather than federal, level. It is a kind of structural mismatch 
between what federal laws require and what administrative capa-
bilities state governments possess. As a body, federal legislators 
have a better idea about the capabilities of federal bureaucracy 
than state bureaucracy. Congress can tailor its delegation to the 
competencies of the federal administration or intentionally legislate 
interagency coordination and overlap.158 Alternatively, Congress 
can create new federal bureaucracy to suit its administrative 
needs. It can do none of this tailoring at the state bureaucratic 
level. 
2. Conflict. 
Sometimes intrastate conflicts are more contentious and diffi-
cult to resolve than those within the federal government. State ex-
ecutives and cabinet officers are often elected independently and 
may come from different political parties.159 Unlike federal admin-
istration officials, state officers and agency heads elected sepa-
rately are not responsible to one another; they are not even neces-
sarily beholden to the same sets of voters. Whereas federal officials 
are all working toward the same goal—and can be removed if they 
are not160—state officers may have very different goals. An elected 
state secretary of state, for example, may rely on a coalition of vot-
ers that includes public assistance recipients and will have a 
strong interest in enforcing the provision of the NVRA that re-
quires states to offer voter registration at public assistance agen-
cies. A governor in the same state who relies on a coalition of voters 
 
 156 Id (noting that the “presumption” that agency leaders have access to the information 
necessary to diagnose noncompliance “ignores the facts of institutional life”). 
 157 Id at 1060–61 (arguing that litigation against complex organizations can be revela-
tory information-gathering exercises even for the organization itself). 
 158 See generally Freeman and Rossi, 125 Harv L Rev 1131 (cited in note 20). 
 159 See Seifter, 131 Harv L Rev at 526–27 (cited in note 20). 
 160 See Farber and O’Connell, 105 Cal L Rev at 1436–37 (cited in note 20); Rachel E. 
Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture through Institutional Design, 89 Tex L Rev 
15, 27–30 (2010) (discussing for-cause and at-will removal provisions). 
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more geared toward car owners will have a stronger interest in en-
forcing the provision of the NVRA that requires states to offer voter 
registration at motor vehicle offices. And since full compliance with 
the NVRA requires these two state officials to coordinate, compli-
ance will suffer in a way that it would not if it were administered 
by multiple federal actors. 
Consider the interagency conflict that gave rise to Virginia Office 
for Protection and Advocacy v Stewart.161 Two federal laws—the 
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 
2000162 and the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals 
Act of 1986163—offer federal funds to states to create an organiza-
tion, either state- or privately run, designed to protect the rights of 
people with disabilities or mental illness.164 Virginia created a state 
agency—the Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy (VOPA)—
to fill that role.165 The dispute underlying the case arose when 
VOPA attempted to investigate mistreatment of disabled patients 
at state-run mental institutions.166 The state officers responsible 
for those hospitals refused to give information to VOPA, invoking 
peer privilege.167 VOPA sued. 
VOPA and the state hospital directors were accountable to dif-
ferent actors; no hierarchical relationship existed between them. 
VOPA was governed by an eleven-member board: three appointed 
by the governor, five by the speaker of the state house, and three 
by the state senate committee on rules.168 Meanwhile, the state di-
rector of the mental hospitals was appointed by the governor.169 
Further, while the state mental hospital received its funding from 
the state coffers, VOPA was funded federally.170 Given these differ-
ences, we might expect that these two state actors may not be will-
ing to accommodate each other’s requests. And though the Supreme 
Court ultimately ruled that VOPA could sue the state hospital di-
 
 161 563 US 247 (2011) (“VOPA v Stewart”). 
 162 Pub L No 106-402, 114 Stat 1677, codified at 42 USC § 15001 et seq. 
 163 Pub L No 99-319, 100 Stat 478, codified as amended in various sections of Title 42. 
 164 VOPA v Stewart, 563 US at 250–51. 
 165 Id at 251–52. 
 166 Id at 252. 
 167 See Virginia v Reinhard, 2008 WL 2795940, *1 (ED Va), revd, Virginia v Reinhard, 
568 F3d 110 (4th Cir 2009), revd and remd, VOPA v Stewart, 563 US 247 (2011). 
 168 VOPA v Stewart, 563 US at 251–52. 
 169 See Va Code § 37.2-301 (stating that the governor appoints the commissioner of the 
Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services). 
 170 VOPA v Stewart, 562 US at 250. 
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rector, the conflict between those two state agencies frustrated fed-
eral disability rights law for nearly four years.171 Soon after the 
lawsuit, Virginia changed its law to consolidate administration of 
those federal laws into one commission fully appointed by the state 
bureaucracy.172 
The concept of “picket fence federalism” partly explains this 
conflict. Picket fence federalism describes the strength of vertical 
relationships (the picket) among federal, state, and local adminis-
trators working on the same substantive issue.173 Because federal 
money often funds state bureaucrats that administer federal pro-
grams (as in VOPA), those state bureaucrats have a divided loy-
alty: not only to the state government, but also to the federal ad-
ministrators and laws that fund them.174 State bureaucrats share 
vocational and mission-based priorities with federal administra-
tors, and they can be “a surreptitious force for undermining the 
policymaking discretion of elected nonfederal generalists like state 
legislators, city councilors, county commissioners, mayors, and 
governors.”175 These state-level bureaucrats can refuse—or be un-
able—to be responsive to state elected officials176 because federal 
funding insulates them from the state-level political pressures that 
motivate elected politicians.177 
An example of intrastate conflict involving both the state ex-
ecutive and legislature (and my favorite coordination-based exam-
ple because of the sheer number of state bodies involved) comes from 
New York’s failure to comply with the Uniformed and Overseas 
Citizens Absentee Voting Act178 (UOCAVA). An amendment to 
UOCAVA requires states to transmit absentee ballots to military 
 
 171 The parties settled the case on September 6, 2011. Settlement Agreement, Virginia 
v Stewart, No 3:07-CV-734 (ED Va filed Sept 6, 2011). The complaint was initially filed on 
December 3, 2007. Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Virginia v Reinhard, 
No 3:07-CV-734 (ED Va filed Dec 3, 2007). 
 172 Virginia Board for People with Disabilities, About the Board, archived at 
http://perma.cc/TNN3-ZWND. 
 173 See Hills, 53 Stan L Rev at 1227 (cited in note 52). 
 174 See Hanson, Intergovernmental Relations at 51–52 (cited in note 55). 
 175 Hills, 53 Stan L Rev at 1227 (cited in note 52). 
 176 See Hanson, Intergovernmental Relations at 52 (cited in note 55). 
 177 See Hills, 53 Stan L Rev at 1236 (cited in note 52) (“The very independence of state 
agencies from the control of elected state politicians is frequently a product of federal law, 
which requires federal grants to be administered by a ‘single agency’ that is insulated from 
political control.”). 
 178 Pub L No 99-410, 100 Stat 924 (1986), as amended by the Military and Overseas 
Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE Act), Pub L No 111-84, 123 Stat 2318 (2009).  
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and overseas voters at least forty-five days prior to a federal elec-
tion.179 The provision setting the forty-five-day requirement first be-
came effective for the 2010 federal primary and general elections.180 
New York’s election calendar posed a problem for compliance 
with the forty-five-day requirement. State law set New York’s fed-
eral primary election for September 14, 2010, just forty-nine days 
before the general election on November 2, 2010. The New York 
executive branch believed it was unable to meet UOCAVA’s forty-
five-day requirement for the general election, so it obtained a hard-
ship waiver from the Department of Defense on the condition that 
it comply with UOCAVA in other ways and change its election cal-
endar going forward.181 
But New York failed to change its election calendar to prevent 
similar problems in 2012, and 2014, and 2016. The New York State 
Board of Elections argued that it could not change New York’s pri-
mary election date unilaterally,182 and the state assembly and sen-
ate were unable to agree on a new date.183 The state assembly pro-
posed a date in June to more reliably meet UOCAVA’s 
requirements;184 the state senate proposed a date in August, believ-
ing a June primary would inconvenience its members.185 Each of 
these proposals was adopted by two of the four members of the 
board of elections, who submitted these proposals to the court.186 
The state senate even moved to intervene as a party, believing its 
interests were not well represented by the named defendants: the 
 
 179 52 USC § 20302(a)(8). 
 180 MOVE Act, § 579(c), 123 Stat at 2324. 
 181 Specifically, New York agreed to maintain the forty-five-day window between trans-
mission and ballot deadline by transmitting absentee ballots on October 1, 2010 but extend-
ing the deadline for receiving the ballots by thirteen days. However, New York failed to trans-
mit the ballots as required. See United States v New York, 2012 WL 254263, *1–2 (NDNY). 
 182 Memorandum Decision and Order, United States v New York, No 1:10-CV-1214, *3 
(NDNY Feb 9, 2012) (“NY Memorandum Decision and Order”) (noting that the state board 
of elections “suggests that [it] lacks authority to recommend any necessary modifications to 
the resulting calendar”). 
 183 United States v New York, 2012 WL 254263 at *2. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id: 
[T]he Senate urges the court to consider the economic implications of the primary 
date, the hardship of candidates to obtain signatures in the winter months, and 
that June is at the end of the legislative session. More specifically, the Senate 
points out that a June primary would force its members to have to weigh their 
elected responsibilities against the need for political presence in their district. 
 186 See NY Memorandum Decision and Order at *2–3 (cited in note 182). 
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state (represented by the attorney general) and the board of elec-
tions (represented by its own counsel).187 
Channeling Cool Hand Luke, the court quipped that “[w]hat 
we’ve got here is a failure to communicate.”188 The failure of state 
actors to coordinate stood in the way of statewide UOCAVA com-
pliance. In its motion to intervene, the state senate expressed con-
fusion at the different positions taken by different state actors.189 
Because the state parties were never able to agree, the court con-
tinued setting the dates of New York’s elections through injunc-
tions and consent decrees that made statewide compliance with 
UOCAVA possible.190 
In one order, the court acknowledged New York’s coordination 
troubles outright and stated that compliance with UOCAVA de-
pended on compliance by all state actors: “[T]he court observes that 
while the [state board of elections] filed the calendar, New York State 
is also a defendant. The court expects full compliance by all defend-
ants, regardless of how they choose to effectuate such compliance.”191 
Like agency alienation, agency conflict is also a particularly 
difficult barrier to overcome when it happens at the state, rather 
than federal, bureaucratic level. Like state agencies, federal agen-
cies come into conflict with one another.192 But unlike state agen-
cies, the federal bureaucracy has a clear line of authority to resolve 
these disputes, with cabinet secretaries and the president at the 
top.193 No such line can exist in states where state officers are sep-
arately elected, and in those circumstances, no ultimate authority 
(akin to a president) exists to force an intransigent state actor to 
comply. 
 
 187 Motion by the New York State Senate to Intervene and Memorandum in Support 
Thereof, United States v New York, No 1:10-CV-1214, *13–15 (NDNY filed Oct 11, 2011) 
(available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 5134793) (“NY Senate Motion to Intervene”). 
 188 NY Memorandum Decision and Order at *2 (cited in note 182). 
 189 NY Senate Motion to Intervene at *13–15 (cited in note 187). 
 190 See Supplemental Remedial Order, United States v New York, No 1:10-CV-1214, *1–
2 (NDNY Oct 29, 2015); Supplemental Remedial Order, United States v New York, No 1:10-
CV-1214, *1–2 (NDNY Dec 12, 2013); United States v New York, 2012 WL 254263 at *3. 
 191 NY Memorandum Decision and Order at *5 (cited in note 182) (emphasis added). 
 192 See Farber and O’Connell, 105 Cal L Rev at 1378–84 (cited in note 20) (providing 
numerous examples of federal interagency conflict). 
 193 I am oversimplifying conflict resolution at the federal level. See id. But even so, 
federal agencies have, at the very least, a theoretical process and capacity for resolution, 
whereas states may not. 
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3. Role confusion. 
Another state bureaucratic barrier to compliance with federal 
laws is that, without sufficient direction from either state or fed-
eral law, state actors are not always clear on who is responsible for 
administering the law. That lack of clarity can prevent those actors 
from taking responsibility for compliance and makes state account-
ability more difficult to achieve. 
Because every state is different, federal laws rarely specify a 
state actor to administer the program.194 Whereas federal lawmak-
ers can craft legislation that relies on the specific structure of the 
federal bureaucracy—and often do195—they are limited in their 
specificity when it comes to states as administrators. 
Federal laws that rely on states take a variety of approaches 
to coordinating state administration. On one end of the spectrum, 
some federal rights simply create obligations on states and provide 
no detail as to how state officers should work together as adminis-
trators.196 On the other end of the spectrum, some federal laws or 
regulations—especially those that require state buy-in—identify 
specific roles that state officers must take as administrators. In 
those cases, it is up to the states themselves to determine which 
state officer plays which role. 
Any federal law that does not instruct states on how to coordi-
nate internally is susceptible to crowding and neglect. That is, it 
can lead to multiple state actors stepping on one another’s feet or 
the opposite problem: state actors assuming that someone else is 
responsible. Courts are left to sift through state law to determine 
hierarchies of authority between state actors, a task that carries 
its own challenges.197 
A 2017 lawsuit alleging noncompliance with the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel by South Carolina’s municipal courts 
 
 194 But they do sometimes require the states themselves to designate one state actor as 
responsible for administration. See, for example, 52 USC § 20509 (“Each State shall desig-
nate a State officer or employee as the chief State election official to be responsible for coor-
dination of State responsibilities under this chapter.”). 
 195 See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative 
Law, 2006 S Ct Rev 201, 207–16. 
 196 See, for example, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel or the ADA. 
 197 See Krane, Rigos, and Hill, Home Rule in America at 4 (cited in note 129) (“[E]ven 
though state courts typically hold the state-local relationship to be unitary and hierarchical, 
the political reality is that the relationship is more complicated.”); David J. Barron, A Lo-
calist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 Duke L J 377, 393 (2001) (“Local autonomy—or, 
at least, something widely perceived to be local autonomy—is alive and well under state law 
despite an overwhelming state constitutional premise that localism is to be the exception 
rather than rule.”). 
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is illustrative.198 Municipalities in South Carolina may create their 
own local courts, which have authority to prosecute low-level mis-
demeanor crimes.199 However, South Carolina state officials are 
unclear on which state officer bears ultimate responsibility for 
these courts. A recent New York Times article paraphrases the ad-
ministrator for South Carolina’s Office of Court Administration as 
saying that “her office played no role in oversight of municipal 
courts and that the State Supreme Court was responsible.”200 The 
state supreme court clerk “said that the Office of Court Admin-
istration was responsible.”201 
Even when federal laws do specify roles for state actors, and 
even when state actors assume those roles, those actors can feel 
constrained by the limits that state laws place on their authority 
to administer. Whether federal laws can provide state actors with 
powers state law does not already grant is an open question.202 So 
even highly specific federal laws can fall prey to state coordination 
roadblocks in ways that federal laws harnessing the federal bu-
reaucracy do not. 
Litigation in Virginia over compliance with the federal Food 
Stamp Act of 1977203 highlights the compliance challenges of role con-
fusion. In Robertson v Jackson,204 plaintiffs eligible for food stamps 
sued a Virginia state official—the commissioner of the Virginia 
Department of Social Services—for local noncompliance with time-
liness and other requirements of the Food Stamp Act.205 The com-
missioner argued that he could not be held responsible for local 
noncompliance around the state because the plaintiffs had failed 
to sue both the local agencies that administered the food stamp pro-
gram and another state actor, the State Board of Social Services, 
 
 198 Class Action Complaint, Bairefoot v City of Beaufort, No 9:17-cv-02759, *1 (D SC 
filed Oct 11, 2017).  
 199 See SC Code Ann § 14-25-5. 
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 203 Pub L No 95-113, 91 Stat 913, codified as amended at 7 USC § 2011 et seq. 
 204 972 F2d 529 (4th Cir 1992). 
 205 Id at 529–30. 
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which also played an oversight role.206 The commissioner alleged 
that it was the local social service agencies that were actually re-
sponsible for administering the federal program. He also argued 
that it was the state board, and not the commissioner, that was 
empowered by state law to both implement the food stamp program 
in the state and “to require the local authorities to perform the du-
ties imposed by law.”207 
Here, then, the defendant state commissioner was making 
role-confusion arguments in three different ways: interagency con-
fusion, as between the commissioner and the state board; inter-
branch confusion, as among the legislature, the commissioner, and 
the state board; and state-local confusion, as between state actors 
and local agencies. 
This barrier is another that is more salient at the state level 
than at the federal level. Whereas the federal bureaucracy has lit-
tle legal claim to control how it organizes itself when otherwise di-
rected by Congress, states do. As described above, the Supreme 
Court has shielded states from federal interference.208 In doing so, 
it has noted that how a state chooses to structure its government 
is at the core of its sovereignty.209 In ways that the federal bureau-
cracy cannot, states use the language of state sovereignty in litiga-
tion to resist compliance with federal law when it requires states 
to reorganize their government.210 
III.  COORDINATION, POLITICS, AND INEQUALITY 
Bureaucratic undermining carries few of the traditional mark-
ers we associate with state-federal struggle. It does not appear to 
be correlated with geography in the way that, say, Congress deter-
mined that vote discrimination was an especially serious problem 
in the South.211 Coordination-based noncompliance cases arise in a 
 
 206 Brief of Appellant, Jackson v Robertson, No 91-2580, *8–17 (4th Cir filed Sept 11, 1992). 
 207 Id at *9–10. 
 208 See notes 61–81 and accompanying text. 
 209 See Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 460 (1991) (“Through the structure of its gov-
ernment . . . a State defines itself as a sovereign.”). 
 210 See Weinstein-Tull, 117 Colum L Rev at 883–86 (cited in note 7) (collecting and 
describing sovereignty-based state arguments in suits alleging violations of federal law). 
 211 See Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 Yale L J F 1, 7 
(2017) (“The Voting Rights Act and other laws adopted pursuant to the Reconstruction 
Amendments, for example, reflect the fear that elected officials and voters in many states, 
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geographically diverse set of states.212 Nor does bureaucratic un-
dermining appear to be driven by political party or ideology:213 state 
bureaucratic undermining occurs in states across the political 
spectrum.214 
If not politics or geography, what explains state bureaucratic 
undermining? This Part explores practical and theoretical expla-
nations for the bureaucratic barriers described above. It argues 
that because intrastate coordination requires political will, federal 
rights requiring extensive coordination will not always effectively 
serve the people they seek to benefit. Those with little political 
power—including racial minorities and low-income populations—
struggle to force state bureaucratic compliance. States, as com-
pared with the federal government and local governments, are of-
ten uniquely unreceptive fora for prorights political efforts. 
Breaking down any of the three barriers described above—al-
ienation, conflict, and role confusion—requires coordination in the 
form of either consent or coercion.215 Either form requires expend-
ing political capital.216 Take a federal law that demands coordina-
tion between two state actors with a hierarchical relationship 
(state and local actors, for example). Given a baseline of inaction 
or noncompliance, statewide compliance requires the state-level 
actor to convince the local-level actor to vindicate the right. The 
state actor may be able to convince the local actor to comply with-
out coercion—perhaps by offering funding or reminding the local 
actor of the legal obligation. If unsuccessful, the state actor will 
need to coerce, which implicates the legal architecture governing 
that state-local relationship. If the state actor has removal power 
over the relevant local actors, it may exercise that power. If it no 
longer wants to entrust local actors with administration responsi-
bilities, it could seek authority from the legislature to centralize 
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 213 Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen argues that partisanship explains much state re-
sistance to federal laws. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv L Rev 1077, 
1082 (2014). That division does not seem to explain bureaucratic undermining. 
 214 Coordination-based state noncompliance cases have arisen in blue states like California, 
New York, Illinois, and Rhode Island, as well as red states like Alabama, Louisiana, and 
Oklahoma. 
 215 See notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
 216 Viewing state actors as rational helps to understand how and whether coordination 
happens. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 
72 Wash U L Q 1, 43 (1994). 
2018] State Bureaucratic Undermining 1119 
administration of the right. It might even bring a lawsuit against 
the local agency in cases of local intransigence.217 
All of these options are costly. Funding compliance at the local 
level imposes financial costs. Suing a local administrator imposes 
litigation costs. Removing a local administrator may impose polit-
ical costs if perceived as an intrusion on local autonomy, especially 
if the local administrator is popular or the right is unpopular at 
the local level. Requesting additional authority from the state leg-
islature to recentralize administration of the right at the state level 
could involve negotiations with the legislature and long-term po-
litical costs. 
The options available to state actors in a nonhierarchical rela-
tionship are also costly. Conflicts between cabinet-level actors that 
can’t be resolved will require intervention either by a higher state 
power, if one exists, or the courts. Even conflicts that can be re-
solved through consent require one actor to identify the issue and 
convince the second actor to coordinate. 
Less costly coordination actions tend to be less effective. A re-
cent study about compliance with the NVRA found that minimally 
obtrusive state actions—like well-timed trainings for local officials 
and emails reminding them to comply—were only minimally effec-
tive in fostering local compliance, and only in local offices that were 
already partly compliant.218 The interventions failed to increase 
compliance in noncompliant local offices.219 
In cases where these kinds of thorny intrastate conflicts have 
undermined federal rights, courts have observed that political will 
is an important part of full compliance. In the UOCAVA case 
against New York described above, New York’s existing election 
calendar prevented the state from transmitting ballots to military 
and overseas voters with enough time before the election.220 Be-
tween 2010 and 2015, New York’s state board of elections, state 
assembly, and state senate were unable to come to an agreement 
on amending New York’s election laws to make compliance possi-
ble. “Having had ample opportunity to correct the problem,” the 
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federal court noted, New York “failed to find the political will to do 
so.”221 That lack of political will required the court to “becom[e] em-
broiled in [New York’s] election schemes,” despite normal consid-
erations of comity and federalism.222 
Prison overpopulation in California is another example. Fed-
eral courts ordered California to reduce its overcrowded prison 
population. California’s plan to reduce its prison population (called 
“realignment”) required state-local coordination. Because it in-
volved sending state prisoners to local jails, Governor Jerry Brown 
needed to secure the cooperation of local governments.223 One of the 
judges in the case described this process as follows: “It’s clear to 
me . . . that realignment is a political deal, in which the Governor 
went to the fifty-eight counties and got something that every 
county could live with.”224 
On the other side of the ledger, costs to the state for noncom-
pliance are relatively low. The Eleventh Amendment immunizes 
states from retroactive damages claims even when the state or a 
state actor violates a federal right.225 Plaintiffs may obtain prospec-
tive injunctive relief,226 but that amounts only to compliance with 
the statutory or constitutional right that the state was already re-
sponsible for.227 
In addition, state actors are unlikely to suffer political costs 
for failing to comply with federal rights that seek to empower the 
disenfranchised. As a general matter, state actors do not face much 
political pressure from low-income populations—those most likely 
to be the beneficiaries of federal rights. Voter turnout falls as in-
come falls.228 Public assistance recipients, who stand to benefit 
from compliance with the NVRA, lack political power and influ-
ence. As Professor Laurence Lynn put it, “Human services have no 
constituency. Their clients do not vote, at least not in large enough 
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numbers to make a difference to the average legislator.”229 And it 
is well-established that policy outcomes are largely unresponsive 
to the preferences of low-income individuals.230 
Not unlike low-income communities, racial minorities also on 
average lack political power as compared to whites.231 The data 
show that blacks and Hispanics struggle to influence governmental 
policy: “Spending on a given item is more apt to decrease when 
blacks and Hispanics favor a rise, and more apt to increase when 
they favor a fall.”232 
Lacking political power is particularly meaningful in the state 
context. Our system of federalism already makes change difficult 
to achieve by creating layers of government with overlapping juris-
diction and competency. Professor Lisa Miller has argued that this 
structure disadvantages those without political power: “American 
federalism reinforces existing race and class stratification by cre-
ating a system of multiple political venues that makes it difficult 
for poorly resourced groups to navigate and by driving several lay-
ers of government between citizens who experience these problems 
and lawmakers who have the capacity to ameliorate them.”233 Miller 
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is writing about criminal law and justice, but her argument is dou-
bly powerful in the context of decentralized federal laws. By sepa-
rating principal from agent and decentralizing those legal relation-
ships down through the levels of government, these federal laws 
already obscure lines of authority and accountability and make re-
form complex and burdensome.234 State coordination adds an addi-
tional “venue” to the topography of state governmental actors. 
But states are uniquely bad places to add additional venues. 
State government is particularly opaque to outside interests—in 
Professor Miriam Seifter’s words, “largely invisible. Whereas a 
‘synopticon’ of watchdogs monitors the federal executive branch at 
every turn, state bureaucracy does not operate in a fishbowl.”235 
Because state government is overall less transparent than the fed-
eral government,236 state residents are less aware of how states al-
locate power internally than they are of how power is allocated at 
the federal level. States privatize and delegate many of their own 
functions, making internal markers of responsibility difficult to 
find. And state media has contracted in recent years, leaving the 
inner workings of state government less scrutinized and under-
stood than other levels of government.237 
In addition, internal state politics make state governments 
particularly bad fora to find the political will to administer federal 
rights. Professor Sheryll Cashin has written about the “political 
economy of state fiscal decisionmaking” in the context of federal 
redistribution programs and has demonstrated that states are less 
interested than the federal government in income redistribution, 
in part because “state political actors, most critically governors, are 
rationally compelled toward the provision of ‘middle class’ ser-
vices.”238 Professor Briffault has similarly argued that states are 
both more attuned to suburban interests than they are to urban 
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ones239 and reluctant to “displace local authority when considera-
tions of equity or efficiency make it appropriate to do so.”240 
Cashin also notes that racial minorities are more likely to be 
subject to discrimination and unfavorable treatment at the state 
level than at the federal level. Again in the public assistance con-
text, she found that state administrators were more likely than 
federal administrators to adopt racist attitudes toward African 
Americans receiving welfare.241 And more broadly, of course, “the 
history of racial subordination in the United States has been 
marked by a great deal of state sponsorship or acquiescence in rac-
ist acts and policies.”242 
Finally, states are more susceptible to lobbying from business 
interests than they are from public interest organizations. That is, 
they are susceptible to “capture” by business interests. “Capture” 
refers to the idea that interest groups—often corporate interests—
are able to further their interests through administrative action at 
the expense of the public interest.243 State agencies are more likely 
to subordinate the public interest to industry interests for two rea-
sons. First, public interest groups have been less active at the state 
level than at the federal level and have not effectively balanced out 
the influence of corporate interests at the state administrative 
level.244 Second, although governors, like presidents, are better 
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able to juggle interest group priorities than are individual state 
agencies, state agencies enjoy less executive oversight because 
state executive branches are less centralized than the federal ex-
ecutive branch.245 
These three reasons—state opacity, a political slant away from 
the interests of racial minorities and low-income groups, and a 
skew toward business interests—all make state government espe-
cially difficult to navigate for disenfranchised communities. Fed-
eral rights that demand intrastate coordination, in concert with 
state governments not built for that coordination, increase state-
level complexity of administration. 
Extensive intrastate coordination requirements can therefore 
serve as an avenue for existing inequality to manifest as unequal 
administration, even without any obvious racial animus.246 This 
resonates with accounts of structural inequality. Professor Richard 
Ford, for example, has put forth a structural argument that 
[r]ace-neutral policies, set against an historical backdrop of 
state action in the service of racial segregation and thus 
against a contemporary backdrop of racially identified space—
physical space primarily associated with and occupied by a 
particular racial group—predictably reproduce and entrench 
racial segregation and the racial-caste system that accompa-
nies it.247 
Professor Rachel Moran has noted that 
the model of racial animus that animated Brown seem[s] to be 
growing obsolete. . . . Yet, even with these reported gains in 
racial tolerance and understanding, residential segregation 
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has remained a commonplace feature of American life, and sig-
nificant gaps in educational attainment, earnings, and wealth 
persist between White and non-White Americans.248 
Although the idea of structural racism and inequality is not a new 
one,249 we are continuing to learn about how racism and income 
inequality have become so deeply a part of our institutions that 
those institutions now reproduce inequality inadvertently. Statis-
ticians are beginning to demonstrate how existing racial inequality 
biases computer-based criminal justice tools designed to take race 
out of the equation. Computer programs that determine bail 
amounts based on supposedly unbiased factors rely on arrest his-
tory, for example, but prior arrests are determined by racially dis-
criminatory arrest patterns.250 Sentencing algorithms also contain 
“hidden biases” that disfavor racial minorities.251 These programs, 
designed to display a veneer of neutrality, become biased against 
racial minorities because they absorb the racial bias of the rest of 
the criminal justice system.252 
IV.  CONSTRUCTING THE CHANNELS OF POLITICAL CHANGE 
Professor John Hart Ely’s classic metaphor for the role of 
courts in policing the law of democracy resonates here. Ely wrote 
that courts should err on the side of “clear[ing] the channels of po-
litical change” to prevent power from becoming entrenched in the 
hands of the powerful.253 
Before you can keep channels clear, you must create them. 
State agency alienation, conflict, and role confusion represent dif-
ferent kinds of nonexistent, blocked, or damaged channels through 
state bureaucracy. Effectively administering a federal obligation 
requires states to construct these channels, even through rocky 
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terrain: between actors of different political parties, between ac-
tors that have no other reason to communicate, or between actors 
averse to the obligation in the first place. 
In this Part, I catalog remedies—including injunctions, con-
sent decrees, and out-of-court settlements—that seek to address 
state coordination problems by creating and repairing these chan-
nels. These remedies reflect the state coordination problem in their 
form and focus. Unlike the traditional injunctions of the civil rights 
era that were often hundreds of pages long254 and “took the form of 
highly detailed regulatory codes embracing vast provinces of ad-
ministration,”255 these remedies take the form of choreography. 
They treat functional government as the goal and create pathways 
between state actors by specifying how they must work together to 
achieve compliance. 
I call these features “coordination remedies.” I find that recent 
coordination remedies primarily address intrastate coordination 
issues in two ways: agency integration and role clarity. I describe 
these two remedial tools using examples of remedies from suits 
against states and suggest a third tool that I have not seen exe-
cuted: a state agency employee dedicated to representing the inter-
ests of beneficiaries of federal rights who are not sufficiently rep-
resented in state government already. 
Understanding these remedies is valuable for four reasons. 
First, they describe the tools practitioners believe are necessary to 
address state coordination problems and vindicate federal rights. 
Because many of these remedies are negotiated consent decrees 
and out-of-court settlements, they should also provide insight into 
the kinds of barriers state bureaucrats themselves see and the 
changes they believe are necessary to clear the channels. This on-
the-ground perspective is impossible to glean from the statutory 
language itself. 
Understanding these remedies is also helpful for Congress to 
understand both what kinds of structures undermine its laws and 
what it takes to solve these problems. Though this Article focuses 
on state noncompliance, it is at its heart a critique of the federal 
decision to decentralize. As described above, Congress currently 
takes a variety of approaches to coordinating state bureaucracy, 
from doing nothing at all to requiring states to provide something 
 
 254 See, for example, Sandler and Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree at 45–46, 63 (cited 
in note 38) (describing a lawsuit challenging New York City’s special education program in 
which the parties adopted two consent decrees that totaled 515 pages). 
 255 Sabel and Simon, 117 Harv L Rev at 1024 (cited in note 74). 
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akin to a coordination plan.256 But Congress could do more. Con-
cerns like state bureaucratic undermining should make Congress 
think twice about relying on states to administer complex statu-
tory rights that join extensive intrastate coordination with politi-
cally marginalized beneficiaries unlikely to motivate state actors 
themselves. 
Second, even if Congress chooses to decentralize, it can design 
its policies to better accommodate contemporary challenges of 
state administration. As Professor Heather Gerken points out, 
fully recentralizing decentralized federal rights likely requires a 
level of national political will that, almost by definition, does not 
exist—if it did, the policy would not be decentralized in the first 
place.257 But numerous reforms short of full recentralization exist 
as well. As described in this Part, those reforms include legislative 
tools and requirements for constructing channels of state authority 
and efficiency258 as well as mechanisms for motivating state actors 
like proxy-representation requirements or monetary penalties.259 
Third, I hope that synthesizing these remedies will be helpful 
for advocates, potential plaintiffs, and potential defendants. When 
a state appears to be out of compliance with a federal right, these 
remedial trends can serve as diagnostic tools: top-line locations 
within the state topography to examine to find the root of the prob-
lem. Compiling these remedies may also be useful if a defendant 
challenges the intrusions into state sovereignty a coordination 
remedy makes.260 In this Part, I describe a set of courts that have 
already approved, or even issued, remedies of this kind. 
 
 256 See Part II.A. 
 257 See Gerken, 105 Cal L Rev at 1710 (cited in note 3) (“Academics often unthinkingly 
blame decentralization for shortfalls in our equality norms. This simplistic formulation ig-
nores the fact that the turn to decentralization is a sign of weakness in the norms them-
selves. We adopt a decentralized solution only when our national norm is to tolerate short-
falls.”). 
 258 See Part IV. As another example from the public assistance context, Cashin has 
suggested that federal welfare reform should include greater tools for state accountability 
and standardizing state processes—an option short of recentralizing. Cashin, 99 Colum L 
Rev at 618–22 (cited in note 59). 
 259 For two illuminating works that contemplate and complicate the relationship be-
tween monetary penalties and administrative decisionmaking, see generally Joanna C. 
Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement 
Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L Rev 1023 (2010); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: 
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U Chi L Rev 345 (2000). 
 260 As I note in Part I, courts increasingly protect states from federal remedial intru-
sion. See notes 61–81 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, understanding this set of contemporary remedies 
helps us understand remedies trends generally. Public law litiga-
tion is “[p]rotean,”261 and public law remedies have evolved over the 
past fifty years. Contextualizing coordination remedies within the 
broader legal and political milieu may help us identify how states 
and state institutions are changing as well. 
A. Agency Integration 
Remedies for coordination-based noncompliance with federal 
law commonly seek to integrate two state actors so that they are 
both able and forced to communicate effectively. Coordination rem-
edies take two approaches to integration, both of which address 
agency alienation and conflict. 
The first is specific coordination instructions that can be as 
concrete as requiring a state actor to work with local actors to 
transmit absentee ballots262 or as ambitious as requiring state ac-
tors to work together to change state law.263 These instructions are 
mundane and mechanical, and yet state actors are unable to exe-
cute them. In lieu of specific instructions to these actors, recent 
coordination remedies can require that the state actors direct a 
state employee to coordinate between agencies.264 
 
 261 Sabel and Simon, 117 Harv L Rev at 1021 (cited in note 74). 
 262 See, for example, Consent Decree, United States v Illinois, No 1:15-cv-02997, *6 (ND 
Ill Apr 14, 2015) (requiring the state of Illinois and the Illinois Board of Elections to work 
with local election authorities to transmit absentee ballots to military and overseas voters 
by a certain date in a case alleging that an Illinois special election would fail to comply with 
UOCAVA). 
 263 See, for example, id at *8: 
[The state and the board of elections agreed to] take such actions as are necessary 
to assure that all future special elections for Federal office are conducted in ac-
cordance with UOCAVA, including proposing legislation and taking any adminis-
trative actions needed to alter Illinois’ statutorily imposed timetable for conduct-
ing special elections for filling vacancies in the office of United States 
Representative in Congress. Specifically, the State Board of Elections will recom-
mend amendments to the Election Code as required to enlarge the time period for 
conducting such elections sufficiently to guarantee that special primary election 
and special election ballots can be transmitted to UOCAVA voters at least 45 days 
before the date of the election. . . . Defendants shall file with the Court a status 
report on this proposed legislation no later than June 2, 2015. 
 264 A recent out-of-court settlement between voting rights advocates and Oklahoma 
state actors, for example, leans heavily on coordination to ensure compliance with the 
NVRA. The settlement requires the Oklahoma State Election Board to appoint a staff per-
son to coordinate statewide compliance with the NVRA. That coordinator must work with 
the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, the Oklahoma Department of Health, and 
the Oklahoma Healthcare Authority to ensure NVRA compliance, including by providing 
trainings, monitoring compliance, and issuing reminders about voter registration deadlines. 
Settlement Agreement between the Metropolitan Tulsa Urban League and the Oklahoma 
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Second, coordination remedies promote agency integration by 
requiring state actors to monitor compliance with the federal right 
and report that data to codefendants, the plaintiffs, and the 
court.265 Requiring a state to actively monitor compliance among 
the relevant administrators not only forces the state to own its 
compliance numbers,266 but also strengthens the relationships 
among those state actors. Unless federal laws or remedies require 
regular and functional communication between state bodies, that 
communication is unlikely to occur on its own. As one voting rights 
advocate put it, remedies that mandate state supervision over local 
governments help local “responsibilities become institutionalized 
as part of the agency infrastructure—just like any other agency 
responsibility.”267 
An example comes from an out-of-court NVRA settlement 
reached between advocacy organizations and two California state 
actors: the secretary of state and the executive director of Covered 
California, the state’s health care exchange under the Affordable 
Care Act268 (ACA). Four years after President Barack Obama 
signed the ACA, the ACLU and other advocacy groups noticed that 
California was not offering voter registration forms with applica-
tions for federally subsidized health coverage through California’s 
exchange,269 in violation of the NVRA. 
California was a sensible, sympathetic target state for the 
ACLU. The state secretary of state is California’s chief election of-
ficial270 and is specifically designated as responsible for complying 
with the NVRA. Although the secretary—Debra Bowen, at the 
time—and the governor were not accountable to one another, they 
were both Democrats.271 The secretary, though responsible under 
 
State Election Board, *5 (July 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/QL4Q-SW6E. The rem-
edy also requires each piece of the relevant Oklahoma state-level bureaucracy to appoint 
staff to coordinate between the state offices and their local affiliates. Id at *6–10. 
 265 See note 157 and accompanying text. 
 266 Just the act of monitoring and creating compliance data can improve compliance. 
See, for example, Heather K. Gerken, The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System Is 
Failing and How to Fix It 82–89 (Princeton 2009). 
 267 Email from Lisa J. Danetz to Justin Weinstein-Tull (Apr 11, 2016) (on file with author). 
 268 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
 269 See Gluck, 121 Yale L J at 581–82 (cited in note 22) (describing expansions to Medicaid, 
“the federal health-insurance program for low-income individuals that is administered in 
cooperation with the states”). 
 270 Cal Election Code § 10 (“The Secretary of State is the chief elections officer of the state.”). 
 271 Democrats tend to support efforts to expand voter registration. See Zachary Roth, 
Voter Registration at the Center of Partisan Voting War (MSNBC, Sept 21, 2015), online at 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/voter-registration-the-center-the-voting-wars (visited Jan 
12, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (noting that Democratic states have sought to expand 
access to voter registration). 
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California law for complying with the NVRA,272 is not responsible for 
administering California’s state ACA exchange, however. That re-
sponsibility rests with the executive director of Covered California.273 
The secretary and the executive director would need to coordinate 
to comply with the NVRA; they were not coordinating.274 
The potential plaintiffs were able to reach an out-of-court set-
tlement with the two state officials.275 The document clearly in-
tends to foster integration between the two state actors in both of 
the ways described above. It spells out the many ways that the sec-
retary and Covered California must interact to ensure compliance. 
Covered California must provide the secretary with a draft letter 
it intends to send to its clients about voter registration;276 it must 
tell the secretary how many voter registration forms it needs to 
send with its public assistance applications;277 the secretary must 
supply those forms to Covered California in a timely manner;278 
and so forth. 
It also makes the two actors accountable to one another. It re-
quires the two actors regularly to “communicate,”279 to send each 
other administrative updates on compliance,280 and to collect and 
send each other enrollment and registration statistics.281 These re-
quirements force the two state actors to provide each other with 
up-to-date status reports on their compliance. 
 
 272 Cal Election Code § 2402(a) (designating the secretary of state “the chief state elec-
tions official responsible for coordination of the state’s responsibilities under the federal 
National Voter Registration Act of 1993”). 
 273 Covered California: The California Health Benefit Exchange, Peter V. Lee, Executive 
Director, archived at http://perma.cc/NN7F-M8TD. 
 274 Macías Interview (cited in note 110). 
 275 Settlement Agreement Regarding Interim Remedial Measures and System Integra-
tion of Covered California’s Voter Registration Obligations (Mar 21, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6M2W-7Q36 (“Cal Settlement Agreement”). A close reading of the document 
suggests that Covered California was more enthusiastic about the settlement. For example, 
the document is signed by all parties, but only Covered California “expressed a desire to 
ensure that all applicants since October 1, 2013, and moving forward, receive the oppor-
tunity to register to vote as required by law.” The document does not include any similar 
mention by the secretary. Id at *1, 12–13. 
 276 Id at *4. 
 277 Id.  
 278 Id at *4, 7–8. 
 279 Cal Settlement Agreement at *4 (cited in note 275). 
 280 Id at *5 (requiring Covered California to provide monthly reports to the secretary 
detailing the number of health care recipients offered voter registration opportunities and 
requiring the secretary to provide Covered California with monthly reports on the number 
of completed or incomplete voter registration forms received by health care recipients). 
 281 Id at *9–10. 
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B. Role Clarity 
Reflecting the role confusion that can arise when states are not 
naturally organized to administer a federal law, coordination rem-
edies carefully define the roles, responsibilities, and powers of the 
defendants in the litigation. They ensure that a clear line of au-
thority exists among state bureaucratic actors, and they provide 
role specificity when more than one state actor is available to play 
a role. 
As an illustration, consider this 2007 institutional suit that in-
digent criminal defendants brought against the state and governor 
of New York alleging that the state violated the defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel because five counties failed to provide 
adequate representation.282 After seven years of litigating whether 
the state and governor of New York were proper defendants to the 
action (they were),283 the parties settled in 2014.284 As New York is 
a large state and compliance with the Sixth Amendment requires, 
like many federal laws, a great deal of cooperation between state 
and local actors, the parties entered into a coordination remedy. 
The remedy choreographed cooperation between state actors, 
beginning with role clarity. It acknowledges the state administrative 
bodies designed to improve the quality of indigent defense in New 
York—the Office of Indigent Legal Services (ILS) and the Indigent 
Legal Services Board (ILSB)—and states that these bodies “have 
the legal authority to monitor and study indigent legal services in 
the state, to recommend measures to improve those services, to 
award grant monies to counties to support their indigent represen-
tation capability, and to establish criteria for the distribution of 
 
 282 Hurrell-Harring v State, 930 NE2d 217, 219 (NY 2010). 
 283 When sued, the State of New York moved to dismiss the charges as nonjusticiable 
because (1) New York’s decision to delegate indigent defense to local governments was a 
legislative decision, not remediable by courts; and (2) local governments were indispensable 
parties that must be joined for litigation to proceed. Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Hurrell-Harring v State, No 8866-07, *16–17, 27–28 (NY 
Sup filed Apr 4, 2008). See also Brief for Respondents, Hurrell-Harring v State, No 2010-
0066, *31–36 (NY App filed Dec 4, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 6409872) (argu-
ing, again, that plaintiffs’ claims were nonjusticiable before the court of appeals after pre-
vailing in state trial court). 
 New York’s highest court ruled against the state and held that the legislative decision 
to decentralize provision of indigent defense did not insulate the state from the Sixth 
Amendment. Hurrell-Harring, 930 NE2d at 227–28 (noting that “[i]t is, of course, possible 
that a remedy in this action would necessitate the appropriation of funds and perhaps, par-
ticularly in a time of scarcity, some reordering of legislative priorities” but also that “this 
does not amount to an argument upon which a court might be relieved of its essential obli-
gation to provide a remedy for violation of a fundamental constitutional right”). 
 284 Stipulation and Order of Settlement, Hurrell-Harring v State, No 8866-07, *1 (NY 
Sup Oct 21, 2014) (“NY Settlement”). 
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such funds.”285 The remedy states that “the parties agree that ILS 
is best suited to implementing, on behalf of the State, certain obli-
gations arising under this Agreement.”286 Other state actors in-
clude the governor and the five counties where noncompliance 
arose.287 
Perhaps reflecting a concern about the role of the ILS, which 
was not a party to the lawsuit, the remedy states that the ILSB di-
rected the ILS to comply with the terms of the remedy and includes, 
as an appendix, a document entitled “Authorization of the Indigent 
Legal Services Board and the New York State Office of Indigent 
Legal Services Concerning Settlement of the Hurrell-Harring v. 
State of New York Lawsuit.”288 This document acknowledges that 
some of the representations in the remedy require implementation 
by the ILS, direct the ILS to implement the requirements, and 
state that the ILS agrees to implement the requirements.289 
This document institutionalizes the remedy’s requirements 
into the state’s administrative infrastructure and recognizes that 
state agencies may maintain independence from the governor, de-
spite the governor’s best efforts. Here, the ILSB is an independent 
agency. Its chair is the chief judge of New York’s Court of Appeals,290 
and its members are unpaid.291 The remedy brings the ILSB into 
the fray and aligns the mission of the ILSB with the mission of the 
decree. 
Finally, the remedy creates a direct line of authority and su-
pervision among state actors. It requires the governor to “coordi-
nate and work in good faith with the Office of Court Administration 
[ ] to ensure, on an ongoing basis, that each judge and magistrate 
within the Five Counties, including newly appointed judges and 
magistrates, is aware of the responsibility to provide counsel to In-
digent Defendants at Arraignments.”292 
 
 285 Id at *2. 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id at *3. 
 288 NY Settlement at Exhibit A (cited in note 284). 
 289 Id at *2–3, Exhibit A. 
 290 NY Exec Law § 833(1)(a). 
 291 NY Exec Law § 833(5). 
 292 NY Settlement at *6 (cited in note 284). For another example, see a coordination 
remedy in a case that the United States brought against the State of Rhode Island, the 
Rhode Island Board of Elections, and various state actors for violating the NVRA. The con-
sent decree states that the state secretary of state is the chief state elections official and 
ultimately responsible for coordinating compliance with the NVRA, but it also describes the 
very specific responsibilities of the state board of elections in administering the state’s elec-
tions programs. Consent Decree, United States v Rhode Island, No 1:11-cv-00113-S, *3, at 
¶ 5 (D RI Mar 18, 2011): 
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These remedies fill in the gaps of existing state law. In this sense, 
coordination remedies are judicial equivalents to state-enabling 
legislation. State legislatures commonly enact state-enabling laws 
that translate the general terms and requirements of federal laws 
onto the specific contours of state structures.293 
C. Representation 
These remedies—integration and role clarity—address the bu-
reaucratic barriers of agency alienation, conflict, and role confu-
sion that I describe above.294 But they do not address the effects 
that the coordination problem can have on racial minorities and 
low-income groups.295 In fact, while surveying these remedies, I 
have not seen any that specifically guard against coordination’s po-
tential to reinforce racial and income stratification. 
Scholarship on representation in the federal administrative 
state provides the beginnings of a solution. Administrative law 
scholars have recently proposed the idea of “proxy representation”: 
government-funded administrators stationed within the federal 
bureaucracy that give voice to underrepresented groups in the 
rulemaking process.296 These proxies are meant to counterbalance 
the existing influence of business interests on federal rulemaking. 
 
Notwithstanding the Secretary of State’s designation as the chief state election 
official, the Defendant Rhode Island Board of Elections has the powers and duties 
to: Arrange and make provisions for the registration of voters pursuant to the 
[NVRA]. . . . The state board shall formulate programs to assist those persons or 
organizations desiring to register voters and shall provide, pursuant to proce-
dures, rules, and regulations it shall adopt, voter registrations services which may 
include training sessions, registration materials, manuals and other services for 
the purpose of registering to vote eligible Rhode Island citizens. 
See also Consent Decree, United States v New York, No 1:10-cv-01214, *2–3, at ¶¶ 4–6 
(NDNY Oct 19, 2010) (differentiating and clarifying the election administration roles of the 
state of New York, the New York State Board of Elections, and local elections officials in a 
case alleging that New York violated UOCAVA). 
 293 Tellingly, many ACLU affiliates focus just as much on legislative change at the state 
level as they do on litigation against states. Macías Interview (cited in note 110). It is beyond 
the scope of this Article, but I suspect that for any given federal requirement, the presence 
of state-enabling legislation that clearly defines the roles of various state actors prevents 
coordination-based noncompliance. 
 294 See Part II.B. 
 295 See Part III. 
 296 See, for example, Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 
130 Harv L Rev 31, 117–18 (2016) (describing examples of proxy representation); Shirin 
Sinnar, Institutionalizing Rights in the National Security Executive, 50 Harv CR–CL L Rev 
289, 294–300 (2015) (describing ways that the national security bureaucracy has institu-
tionalized stakeholder representatives inside of the administrative apparatus). 
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Coordination remedies should make use of proxy representa-
tion as well. As described above, business interests have an out-
sized impact on decisionmaking in state government—even more 
so than at the federal level.297 To promote stakeholder representa-
tion from within state government, coordination remedies could re-
quire states to appoint an internal proxy representative to protect 
the interests of politically marginalized groups. These remedies al-
ready commonly require states to appoint one or more internal em-
ployees responsible for facilitating coordination298—either appoint-
ing another employee to represent stakeholder interests during the 
administrative process or adding that responsibility to existing co-
ordinators would not be particularly burdensome. Congress 
could—inside of federal legislation that uses states as administra-
tors—require states to appoint proxy representatives at the outset. 
I see proxy representation as a way to institutionalize respon-
siveness to marginalized voices, especially voices with no clear way 
to make political change. The representative should be in touch 
with the broader set of stakeholders around the state or local gov-
ernment. The power of the representative could vary, from a re-
quired consultation, to someone who must be in the room when ad-
ministrative decisions are made, to someone with actual veto 
power over a limited set of administrative decisions that affect po-
litically marginalized groups. 
This kind of representation comes with its own administrative 
challenges. It does not escape me that adding an additional node 
to the state bureaucratic policymaking process itself has the poten-
tial to contribute to the coordination problems that cause under-
mining. In addition, deciding how to incorporate proxy representa-
tion inside of state government requires choosing some 
stakeholders over others and could lead to further exclusion of 
groups with little political power. Any given court, state govern-
ment, or federal statute would need to balance the benefits of im-
proved representativeness with the costs of additional bureaucracy. 
CONCLUSION 
I intend this Article to offer a new critique of decentralization. 
A word of warning at a time when states appear to be the best 
venue for progressive change. And an invitation for scholars to dive 
more deeply into state and local bureaucracy to better understand 
both how federal laws filter down to people themselves and why 
 
 297 See notes 243–45 and accompanying text. 
 298 See notes 262–64 and accompanying text. 
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those laws have struggled to correct persistent inequality. More 
specifically, I understand the state coordination problem to be an 
understudied mechanism by which rights lose their effectiveness 
and racial and income stratification remain entrenched. Extensive 
coordination requirements allow intrastate politics and bureau-
cracy to undermine federal rights. 
I expect this undermining to grow, not recede. State coordina-
tion problems may seem small when viewed in the context of fed-
eralism writ large, and I concede that not all federal rights impli-
cate state bureaucracy and coordination. But as described in 
Part I, state bureaucracy is an increasingly important vehicle for 
federal policy priorities. It is increasingly large. And it is increas-
ingly protected by courts from unwanted federal interference.299 
Stepping back, I conclude by posing two questions. First, is 
state bureaucratic undermining a form of resistance to federal law? 
It hasn’t been treated as such, certainly by the academy—although 
there is a massive literature on intentional state resistance to fed-
eral law during the past seventy years, almost nothing exists that 
documents this subtler, but still devastating, bureaucratic under-
mining. Nor does undermining resemble the kind of resistance we 
are familiar with: “[o]rganized . . . opposition to an invading, occu-
pying, or ruling power.”300 
But there is another way to use the word “resistance”—a sec-
ond definition: “[t]he impeding or stopping effect exerted on an ob-
ject or substance by another, or by a force.”301 This is state bureau-
cratic undermining—resistance as friction. 
Expanding our idea of state resistance to federal law to include 
this second definition is one way to acknowledge and address struc-
tural—rather than overt—inequality and racism within our sys-
tem of decentralized law. It ups the stakes of this kind of noncom-
pliance, not unlike how employment discrimination scholars have 
developed theories of disparate impact that expand our under-
 
 299 See notes 61–81 and accompanying text. Although outside the scope of this Article, 
criminal law is increasingly bureaucratized as well. See generally Daphna Renan, The 
Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 Stan L Rev 1039 (2016) (describing 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment as an administrative challenge and sketching an 
administrative framework for addressing that challenge). See also Stuntz, 121 Harv L Rev 
at 1980 (cited in note 4) (noting that “America’s justice system already is bureaucratized” 
and that “the most important bureaucracies—police forces and district attorneys’ offices—
are governed by local politics and politicians”). 
 300 Oxford English Dictionary, online at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/163661 (vis-
ited Apr 21, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 301 Id. 
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standing of how workplace and societal structures cause discrimi-
nation.302 To the extent that state-sponsored discrimination is 
evolving, and state bureaucracy provides new avenues for com-
pounding existing inequality, our federalism vocabulary should re-
flect that evolution. 
Second, is state bureaucratic undermining something we 
should condemn, or is it a feature of federal decentralization that 
serves a useful function in our federalist government? 
As a preliminary matter, the partisan valence of undermining 
may be less obvious than the case studies in this Article suggest. I 
used examples from federal rights that get more support from the 
left than the right: indigent defense, public assistance, prison re-
form, etc. The military voting statute, which joins military vote out-
reach with ballot access, may be more politically ambiguous. Even 
so, Democrats would likely support vigorous federal oversight of the 
collection of rights highlighted here, whereas Republicans might 
hope for, defend, or even build in opportunities for undermining. 
But you could easily imagine a decentralized federal law that 
the left would want to undermine and the right would want to vig-
orously enforce. Consider a federal immigration or deportation law 
that requires states to act and in doing so, requires otherwise al-
ienated state agencies to work together. The politics of enforce-
ment would be flipped. That said, for the reasons I laid out in 
Part III, I would expect undermining to harm those with the least 
political power to make state government work. 
With the political and policy valence of undermining poten-
tially up for grabs and undertones of racial and income inequality, 
process considerations—rather than substantive or political 
ones—will be most helpful in evaluating undermining. That is, un-
dermining is least likely to serve a useful function when it has no 
expressive or dialogue-creating properties because it is hidden deep 
inside state government or in some other media-poor environment, 
like small local governments; when the state policymaking process 
excludes stakeholder voices; or when actual noncompliance with fed-
eral law is at issue, rather than rights-narrowing state action. 
These process considerations help contextualize state under-
mining on the spectrum of state resistance to federal law more 
 
 302 See, for example, Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 Cal L Rev 
1055, 1057–72 (2017) (theorizing a “recklessness” standard for employment discrimination, 
“arguing for liability where an employer acts with reckless disregard for the consequences 
of implicit bias and stereotyping in employment decisions,” and summarizing three existing, 
contemporary models of disparate impact that “[m]oderniz[e]” how disparate treatment is 
evaluated under Title VII). 
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broadly and differentiate it from the examples of state and local 
resistance I began this Article with. California’s “sanctuary state” 
legislation and its compliance with the NVRA, for example, are two 
different kinds of resistance (understood broadly) that arise from 
decentralized policymaking. Whereas California’s immigration 
policy is expressive, set to be litigated in the public square, and a 
valuable national conversation starter, its violations of the NVRA 
are hard to detect, exclude stakeholder input, and mute disagree-
ment through political disempowerment. 
State undermining might therefore serve a useful role in our 
federal government, but not if it entrenches existing political or 
income inequality. Before we celebrate state and local resistance, 
we should make sure to unearth what ordinarily lies hidden: inter-
actions between state actors that provide new explanations for 
some of our most intractable inequalities. We should not take our 
eyes off a growing, changing state bureaucracy. 
